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Recently there has been talk of change in the law of contract in the United States, England,
New Zealand and Japan. Often this is linked to broader trends of internationalisation. This
article builds on the 'form-substance"framework proposed by Atiyah and Summers, focusing
on the.fine print doctrine, the duty Of good faith, and the law of unconscionability and undue
influence. It argues that developments in these a.·eas Of contract law, which control unfair
contracts, tend to be consistent with the overall orientation of each national legal system. This
suggests that counter-systemic developments in each legal system's contract law will be met
by more resistance than expected. Further, thorn, overall orientations are not necessarily
convergent, and this is likely to a#ect the impact of international developments in contract law
on each legal system.
Now it has become widely accepted that there may be more ways than one in which national
common law systems, starting from the same roots, may justifiably go. Different chains of
reasoning and weightings of values may be reasonably open. Indeed United States legal history
has long demonstrated that truth. For a decade or more it has been a commonplace that
* Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. As sociate, JHJ Crawford Law Office. This article is
dedicated to Mr Jonathan Crawford, in regard for his experience and guidance in dealing with the Japanese
legal system at a more practical level, and for allowing the author the time to develop this broader view.
Particular thanks are also due to Professor Tsuneo Matsuinoto (Hitotsubashi University), Associate Professor
Keizo Yamamoto (Kyoto University), and Mr Tomohiko Sinaga (Shiga University), for advice and assistance.
Naturally, however, the usual "fine print" disclaimer applics.
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Australian and Canadian common law, for instance, are not necessarily the same as English
common law. The same has been accepted recently by the Privy Council itself in relation to
New Zealand [...]. But emancipation does not necessarily mean abandonment of cooperation
to mutual advantage. Common denominators may be usefully sought, as long as the process is
**
not compelled from outside and the national ethos is allowed its own weight.
***
Rui wa tomo o motte atsumaru
A The Changing Law of Contract?
Eminent contract law scholars in a number of jurisdictions have recently proclaimed
that contract law is developing in new directions, or at least changing.1 But. like the
diagnosis in 1974 that contract was "dead", is the case for a distinct new direction being
overstated?2 The cynic might say that a changing law of contract promises to make the
world a more interesting place for contract law scholars. Yet eminent judges, who more
directly face the slow accretion of particular cases, also talk of "an emerging maelstrom" or,
more cautiously, note that many such writings "at least superficially show modern contract
** Sir Robin Cooke, President of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, "The Dream of an International Common
Law", Paper presented at the conference on "The Mason Court and Beyond", Melbourne 1995, 12 (footnote
omitted).
*** Like attracts like (Japanese proverb).
1 In the US, see eg I Macneil "Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation" (1974) 60 Va L Rev 589,591
and 595-7, leading to I Macneil The New 5ocial Contract (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980). For similar
interest in England as to what new values might infuse contract law in the light of wider socio-political
developments, see H Collins 'The Transformation Thesis and the Ascription of Contractual Responsibility" in T
Wilhelmsson (ed) Perspectives of Critical Contract Law 293 (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1993), 293-4. In New
Zealand, see D McLauchlan "The 'New' Law of Contract in New Zealand" [1992] NZ Recent L Rev 436 and
even B Coote "The Changing New Zealand Law of Damages in Contract", Paper presented at the 6th Annual
Journal of Contract law Conference: 'The Changing Law of Contract', Auckland, 14-15 August 1995. But see now D
McLauchlan 'The Plain Meaning Rule of Contract Interpretation" (forthcoming, 1996) NZBLQ, and L Nottage
"Form and Substance in New Zealand, US and Japanese Law: What Role for Grand Theory in the World of
International Contracting?" Proceedings of the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on Sociology olf
Law (International Sociological Association), "Legal Culture: Encounters and Transformations", Papers - Section
Meetings, Supplement 1, 203, 211-2. In Japan, see eg T Uchida "The New Development of Contract Law and
General Clauses - A Japanese Perspective -" in The Organising Committee (ed) Japanese and Dutch L:ws
Compared 119, International Center of Comparative Law and Politics, Tokyo, 1992. But see also L Nottage,
"Contract Law, Theory and Practice in Japan: Plus Qa change, plus c'est la mime chose?" in V Taylor (ed)
Australian Perspectives on Asian Legal Systems (Law Book Co, Sydney, forthconung 1996).
2 G Gilmore The Death of Contract (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974). Cf R Speidel "An Essay on the
Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract" (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 1161, and most recently P
Linzer "Law's Unity: An Essay for the Master Contortionist" (1995) 90 NWULR 183.
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law to be in something of a ferment".3 If there is at least some change in a particular
jurisdiction, how extensive is it and what are its longer term prospects?
The question of change in today's law of contract is often linked to the broader
phenomenon of intemationalisation.4 However, the implications of this phenomenon should
not be overstated either. The impact of underlying socio-economic changes brought about by
internationalisation is clear. But possible repercussions on each national legal system and
its contract law deserve to be closely analysed. Furthermore, as the quotation from Sir
Robin Cooke's recent speech implies, there remains a tension between convergence and
divergence, even among common law jurisc ictions.5 Divergence is likely to remain
particularly apparent, when one adds developments within the civil law tradition.6 To the
broad question, "Is commercial law becoming world law?", Hunter and Carter conclude:7
although the movement toward a global commercial legal system is real and will continue, it
will not supplant the many different local variations that now exist.
This article therefore begins to tease out soine significant local variations in contract
law, attempting to identify possible different chains of reasoning and weightings of values.
It proposes a wider framework to determine how differences might relate to a particular
national legal system as a whole - a national legal ethos. Hence the article begins to
consider trajectories for a range of contract law developments at both the national and
international levels.
First, Part B updates and expands on an aspect of the framework developed by Atiyah
and Summers.8 This framework aimed to systematically contrast US and English law. But
New Zealand law, firmly within the common la w tradition, can be readily added. So too
can Japanese law, with some additional difficulty stemming from its roots in the civil law
3 See respectively L Priestley "Contract - The Burgeoning Maelstrom" (1988) 1 ICL 15, and R Cooke
"Introduction" (1995) 9 ICL 3.
4 D King "Commercial Law: Times of Change and Expansion" in R Cranston and R Goode (eds) Commercial and
Consumer Lzw: National and International Dimensions 121 ((-larendon Press, Oxford, 1993); K Keith "Lawyers in
the Law Reform Process" (1993) Paper presented at the 10th Commonwealth law Conference, Nicosia, May 1993,
5 See also J Matson "The Common Law Abroad: English and Indigineous Laws in the British Commonwealth"
(1993) 42 ICLQ 753, 779.
6 J Merryman The Civil Inw Tradition (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1985) All the more so, in light of the
differences within civil law jurisdictions: H Katz 'Taking (Civil Codes Less Seriously" (1987) 50 MLR 1 at 7-8.
7 H Hunter and J Carter "Is Commercial Law becoming a prorld Law?" Paper presented at the 6th Annual Journal
of Contract law Conference: 'The Changing law of Contract' Auckland, 14-15 August 1995, 20.
8 P Atiyah and R Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-An'erican Law: A Comparative Study in Legal Reasoning,
Legal Theory and Ugal Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 198D
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tradition.9 As it may be less familiar to readers, Japanese law is more extensively covered.
The treatment is still tentative and necessarily rather general, but some particular
developments in the various jurisdictions are highlighted to bring out points of comparative
reference.
Atiyah and Summers developed their framework as part of a much broader comparative
study.10 However Part B first expands on aspects of three areas of contract law, which they
cite as examples illustrating different approaches to the general question of determining the
"authoritativeness of law" in each legal system. These are the fine print doctrine, the duty of
good faith, and the doctrines of unconscionability and undue influence. Each is of
considerable contemporary relevance. Together, they represent a significant part of the law
controlling unfair contracts, particularly on standard forms. Part B then considers how
each legal system generally approaches that broader issue through legislative intervention.
The analysis confirms the wider usefulness of Atiyah and Summers' framework.
Part C concludes by outlining how that framework's other dimensions might be fleshed
out. Systemic local variations seem to be confirmed. The framework identifies various
dimensions to a legal system, which seem to fit together quite consistently. To paraphrase
the quoted Japanese proverb: "like attracts like". Each of those dimensions must therefore be
carefully fully explored, before making a definitive pronouncement on developments in a
particular area of law, such as contract law. But already it seems likely that developments
that are broadly counter-systemic may not result in the degree of change in contract law that
some envisage at both national and international levels.
9 Atiyah and Summers (above n 8,430) had indeed anticipated some difficulty in adding a comparison of a civil
law system, particularly one like Japan which had "received" so much of its modern law directly from other
jurisdictions.
10 A primary concern of the authors (above n 8, 28-31) was to reemphasise the coherence of organising a legal
system on more formal lines, in response to criticism of formality in general. Although not expressly stated, that
warning is no doubt directed primarily at the critical legal studies movement (see eg D Kennedy "Legal
Formality" (1973) 2 / Leg Stud 351.) Even so, the authors criticise some excessive formal reasoning and formal
attributes in contemporary English law (above n 8, 421-4).
The present author agrees on the need to consider legal norms, institutions and the general vision of law in
particular legal systems and societies, as a sounder basis for criticism. That tends to be overlooked by those
within in the "critical" tradition both in America (and England) and on the continent. However, such an
extensive inquiry seems likely to identify even more problems in retaining an overall formal orientation in
contract law and its underlying social and political philosophy, in contemporary societies, than Atiyah and
Summers had initially detected. See C Joerges "Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies: Points of
Contact and Divergence" in C Joerges and D Trubek Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989), 597. But cf now R Summers "The Formal Character of Law - Criteria of Validity
for Contracts" (1995) 9 ICL 29,33-34.
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B Dimensions Of Form and Substance
Atiyah and Summers argue that legal reasoning can revolve around two types of
reasons. A substantive reason involves a "moral, economic, political, institutional or other
social consideration".11 Aformal reason is "a legally authoritative reason on which judges
and others are empowered or required to base a decision or action, and such a reason
usually excludes from consideration, overrides, or at least diminishes the weight of, any
countervailing substantive reason arising at the point of decision or action".12
This definition brings out two dimensions of formal reasoning, respectively termed
"authoritative formality" and "mandatory forrnality". Mandatory formality is usually
present in any legal system; but varies depending on its openness to substantive reasons as
well. On the other hand, authoritative formality is fundamental to legal reasoning. However
it derives from the authoritativeness of a rule or other valid legal phenomenon (such as a
statute, case precendent or contract norm), and tliat authoritativeness is partly determined
by standards of validity. Such standards can be e ither "source-oriented" (turning solely on
whether a recognisable source of the rule or norm is seen as valid), or "content-oriented"
(depending to some degree on its substantive content). Thus, this dimension also varies, with
more "formal" legal systems looking to "source-oriented" standards, and more "substantive"
legal systems prefering "content-oriented" standards of validity, to determine the
authoritativeness of legal phenomena.
1 The Authoritativeness of Law: Source- us Coptent-Standards of Validity in Contract
Law
Along the dimension of "authoritative formality", Atiyah and Summers note that English
law has traditionally looked almost exclusively to the source of statute law or of case law,
to determine its validity, with little scope to investigate or challenge its content.13 By
contrast, constitutional law and the nature of cas e law in the US involve more obviously
content-oriented standards and more substantive reasoning.
Atiyah and Summers further argue that "private contract, the largest body of governing
norms in the American system, is also subject to wi de-ranging content-oriented standards of
validity".14 The contrasting source which is impliedly more determinative of the validity of
contract norms in English contract law appears to be the agreement or intentions of the
11 Above n 8, 1.
12 Above n 8, 2. And see now M McDowell and D Webti, The New Zealand Legal System (Butterworths,
Wellington, 1995) 352-357.
13 Above n 8, 42-51. See 1.1.A and 1.1.B in the Figure in the Appendix.
14 Above n 8, 51.
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parties, characteristic of the classical view of contracts deeply rooted in English law.15
From that perspective, the rest of this Part looks more closely at some of the contract law
examples given to support their general proposition.
2. The "Fine Print" Doctrine
The first example is the so-called "fine print" doctrine. In US law, a contract term can be
refused effect because:16
although the writing may plainly have been an offer, the term was not one that an
uninitiated reader ought reasonably to have understood to be part of that offer. This result is
particularly easy to reach if the term is on the reverse side of the form and the reference, if
any, to terms on the reverse side is itself in fine print or otherwise inadequate.
Further, for instance in sales of goods, the §2-316(2) of the UCC requires that written
disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability be reasonably "conspicuous".17
Similarly, in the English law tradition, the "ticket cases" established that reasonable
notice is required of unusual and onerous terms.18 More generally, in Interfoto Library Ltd v
Stiletto Ltd,19 the plaintiff supplier was denied payment pursuant to a clause imposing a
high daily charge for hired transparencies not returned after a certain period. The English
Court of Appeal held that the defendant had no obligation to make such payments, because
the plaintiff had not given sufficient notice that such an onerous term was included in the
contract document.
Likewise, in Livingstone v Roskilly, Thomas J drew on the "ticket cases" to ask: "did the
notice on the wall [of the bailee's premises] impose an onerous condition [on one reading,
excluding the bailee's liability even for negligence] that should have been specifically
drawn to the plaintiffs attention?".20 In this case, notice was held to have been inadequate,
and the exclusion was not allowed.
15 P Atiyah An Introduction to the Iaw qf Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), 8-17, 30-39. Summers (above
n 10, 31) has now further categorised formal criteria for contractual validity as "source-oriented",
"procedurally oriented" and "structurally" oriented. The structure of offer and acceptance, constituting
agreement, would therefore fit into at least the last two of these categories.
16 EA Farnsworth Contracts (Little Brown, Boston, 2ed 1990) 314.
17 As defined in UCC §1-201(1).
18 J Burrows, J Finn and S Todd Cheshire & F®ot's Law of Contract (Butterworths, Wellington, 8th NZ ed 1992)
181-2.
19 [1989] QB 433.
20 [19921 3 NZLR 230, 238.
UNFAIR CONTRACTS - FORM AND SUBSTANCE 253
Japanese courts have used similar techniques in an important series of recent cases, the
so-called "Dial Q2" (or "Dial 0900") cases. An initial issue was whether the defendant,
party to a telephone contract with Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company (NTT), had
to pay NTT charges for information supplied over NTT lines from an information provider
to a third party (typically, the defendant's child). NTT argued that in 1989 it had amended
its standard form telephone contract to clearly record that the party agreed to its collecting
such charges on behalf of the information provider. However, in the first major decision on
this point,21 the Osaka District Court held for the defendant. The Court reasoned that it
was "exceptional" for one party (the defendant) to bear an obligation towards another
(NTI) for the acts of yet another (the information provider); and that when the amendment
was made, the general public was unaware that the charges for such services could easily
escalate. Thus the court held that the amendment had not been made sufficiently clear; the
defendant could not be said to have agreed to such an unusual and onerous amendment.
Thus, on the one hand, the general concern and approach in Japanese law bears some
similarities to that of US, English and New Zealand law: whether an unusual term was
reasonably brought to the other party's notice. "Reasonableness" is clearly a "content-
oriented" standard of validity, pointing to a more substantive approach. On the other hand,
these cases can arguably be readily fitted within a classical framework, reducing this
particular aspect of contract formation to the question of whether the parties have agreed,
as analysed through the conceptual structure of offer and acceptance.22
Japanese law reveals a similar ambivalence in the overlapping but more general area of
doctrines of contract interpretation. For instance, 1 he Osaka District Court judgment might
be seen as applying a broad contra proferentem cloctrine.23 But this doctrine, which first
insists on finding an "ambiguity" in the parties' agreement, still stresses the latter as a
source-oriented standard and thus remains a more formal approach.
More forthrightly, most noticeably in a recent series of insurance contract cases,
Japanese courts have developed principles of "rea sonable intepretation" (goriteki kaishaku)
and "restrictive interpretation" (seigenteki kaishaku). A clause can be interpreted
"restrictively" where a literal reading would lead to "unreasonable results".24 Unlike the
21 Judgment of 22 March, 1993 (reported in (1993) 820 Hanrei Taimizu 108),
22 Atiyah, above n 15, 8-17, 63-65.
23 The author thanks Professor Tsuneo Matsumoto for this su ggestion. If this is so, it may represent a significant
development in the Japanese caselaw. Japanese courts have i·arely attempted to develop this doctrine, at least in
the form proposed by Japanese scholars (A Omura "Keiyaku Naiyo no Shihoteki Kisei [Private Law Regulation of
Contract Content] (1)" (1991) 473 NBL 34, 39).
24 Above n 23,39. Omura cites for instance the Supreme Court decision of 20 February 1987, limiting the effect of
a clause requiring "60 days' notice" of claims to the insuret, given its supposed purpose and legal character.
Also, in a case quite similar to the Interfoto case (above n 19),the Yamaguchi High Court (12 May, 1987) only
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pure version of the contra proferentem doctrine, this may not require Japanese courts to first
strain to find some ambiguity. For instance, in another Dial Q2 case, the Okayama District
Court declared the same clause to be unenforceable, arguing that it must be so interpreted
because its content was unreasonably onerous, even if the clause could be said to be as
unambiguous as NTT had asserted.25 Once again, this may represent a tendency in Japanese
courts towards applying more direct, source-oriented standards of validity, and thus a more
substantive approach. On the other hand, this still occurs under the guise of interpretation
of the parties' agreement, and the precise implications of these cases have been vigorously
debated.26 These counter-tendencies indicate the resiliency of a formal approach.
Similarly, in Livingstone, Thomas J argued that the notice in question did not
unambiguously exclude liability for negligence, so it could be construed contra proferentem
against the negligent bailee.27 However his Honour also suggested that looking for
ambiguity could result in "artificial or strained interpretation".28 His Honour asserted that
another key issue was whether the parties "intended" such a clause to be the subject of
proper and reasonable performance, rather than providing an exclusion even for
negligence.29 However his Honour appears to arrived at something very close to the
doctrine of fundamental breach: the notion that a court will impose minimal obligations in
certain contracts, overriding the parties intentions as evidenced even by the clearest of
exemption clauses to the contrary.30 Other New Zealand courts have not been quick to
pursue this alternative line of reasoning. In any event, Thomas J's insistence that it remains
interpretation of the parties' agreement - however strained - is an indication of the
continued importance of an appeal to "source-oriented" standards in contemporary New
Zealand contract law.
allowed partial enforcement of a clause providing for high liquidated damages on termination, arguing that it
was difficult to foresee that such a clause would have been included in the written contract, and that its content
was unreasonable (above n 23,37, fn 6). See also Y Yamamoto "Futo Joko to Kojo Ryozoku [Unfair Terms, and
Public Order and Good Morals]" (1994) 66 Horitsu /iho 101, 103 (and case cited in his fn 9).
25 19 May, 1994 (unreported). See also T Matsumoto "EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and
Jaan: Does Japanese Law Meet the Standards Set by the Directive?" (1994) 2 Consumer U 141, 143.
26 See eg S Yasunaga, "Hokenkeiyaku no kaishaku to yakkan kisei [The Interpretation of Insurance Contracts and the
Control of Standard Terms]" (1994) 56 Shiho 109.
2 7 Above n 20, 234-235.
28 Above n 20,235.
29 Above n 20,235 and 239.
30 C Nicholson "Excluding Liability for Negligence: 'All Care and No Responsibility' in Livingstone v Roskilly"
(1994) 24 VUWLR 289, 308-312.
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In sum, both the Dial Q2 cases and Livingstone can be seen as developing a test similar to
the "fine print" doctrine. Alternatively they can be seen as promoting an expanded doctrine
of contra proferentem interpretation, or indeed of "restrictive" interpretation or some
version of the doctrine of fundamental breach. Even with that last view, however, these
developments are ambiguous: they can be viewed as representing either a more substantive
approach, or as reconciliable with a formal a pproach to contract law. Hence a closer
comparative analysis of more wide-ranging controls of unfair contract terms is called for.
3 Good Faith, Unconscionability and Undue I,#uence
3.1 United States Law
Good Faith
Atiyah and Summers' second example of substantive, content-oriented standards of
validity in US contract law is "the general obligation of good faith and fair dealing".·31 A
brief survey of the scope of this duty indeed prowides significant contrasts with the English
law tradition, as well as several parallels with Japanese law.
The Uniform Commercial Code (§1-203) and the Restatement (2nd) of Contract (§205)
state that every contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and enforcement. As in Japan, this duty has acted as a lodestone in defining and refining
performance obligations. It determines what inc:idental performance is required, such as
reasonable cooperation so as to satisfy contractual conditions, or what are reasonable
demands in requirements and outputs contracts.32 The duty has also helped to refine rights
of enforcement. It softened the rigour of the "perfect tender" rule, preventing rejection despite
minimal deviations in contract performance. Generally, the duty is associated with the rule
that only a "material" breach can justify the other s ide exercising a right not to perform.33
More ambitiously, but equally familiar to a Japanese lawyer, the duty provides a focus
for discussion as to whether there is or can be a duty to negotiate in good faith before a
contract would usually be said to be validly formed.34
More surprising is the way case law can emerge, in a sudden and highly visible manner,
drawing on this broad notion of good faith. For iristance, the duty of good faith has played
31 Aboven 8,51.
32 H Hunter "The Duty of Good Faith and Security of Perforinance" (1993) 6 /CL 19,23.
3 3 Above n 32, 23-24.
34 Above, n 16, §3.26. However, Farnsworth notes US courts' reluctance to recognise such a duty. Courts still
tend to require a recognisable preliminary agreement, or some form of a contractual agreement to negotiate in
good faith (E A Farnsworth "Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten" (1990) 41 Case
West Res L Rev 203, 212).
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an important role in setting standards and regulating the interests of contracting parties in
automobile or gasoline distributorships, and in franchising. Typical problems, such as the
enforcement of the right to terminate, attracted wide public interest. In the 1970s, in
particular, specific federal and state legislation was enacted. Yet the enactments have
retained standards of a similar level of generality as the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
And, by heightening the overtly political background to the legislation, the development of
this area of the law remained notably substantive.35
Also beginning in the 1970s, some US courts began to overturn the longstanding doctrine
that an employer could terminate the contract with an employee "at will". They created
various public policy exceptions to this doctrine, controlling termination, for instance
where it had followed from an employee's refusal to perform an illegal act. Some went
further and read in a duty of good faith to control the employer's right to terminate at will,
as where the employer's motive was to deny the employee an agreed bonus despite years of
satisfactory service. These developments also attracted widespread public interest, because
many courts then went on to allow large claims for punitive damages.36 However, in the
1980s, these developments slowed. In 1988, a more conservative Supreme Court of
California stressed the limits of the public policy exception, and decided that the breach of
an implied duty of good faith should only gave rise to a contract claim, thus limiting the
scope for claiming punitive damages.37 Nonetheless, even the possibility a claim in contract
for compensatory damages for breach of the implied duty remains a serious consideration
for Californian employers, particularly as it is unclear whether such a duty can be avoided
even by the clearest language excluding it.38 Furthermore, as of 1993, seventeen out of
thirty-six states recognised a cause of action based on a duty of good faith.39 Thus, in the
area of employment contracts, the duty of good faith has played a highly visible role in
developing the law. Also, although proposals to restate or clarify standards by statute have
not met yet with the results evident in the area of distributorships and franchises, the
35 S Macaulay "Long-Term Continuing Relations: The American Experience Regulating Dealerships and
Franchises" in C Joerges (ed.) Franchising and the law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the
United States 179 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1991). The author thanks Mr Richard Boast (Victoria University) for
the reminder that legal reasoning in a particular area can become overall more substantive in nature as a result
of a highly politicised law-making process.
36 S Macaulay, J Kidwell, W Whitford and M Galanter Contracts: Law in Action (The Michie Company,
Charlottesville, 1995), Vol 1, 471-481.
37 Foley v Interactive Data Corp 47 Cal. 3d 654 (1988). See also J Peterson, "The Duty of Good Faith in Insurance
Relationships: The Decision in Gibson v Parkes District Hospital" (1994) 24 VUWLR 189, 198-199.
38 Above n 36, 501.
39 Above n 36,487.
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discussion remains highly political.40 Overall, this area also remains characterised by
distinctly substantive reasoning.
Also in the 1980s, the duty of good faith ,/as invoked in cases an aspect of lender
liability. For instance, a bank was held liable when it refused to advance further funds to a
borrower, despite the agreement permitting the bank to do so if it felt insecure.41 Hunter
notes that such limitations on enforcement of rights may operate under other principles such
as estoppel or waiver, but is generally comfortable with this additional control mechanism
open to US courts.42 He implies that in deciding where to draw the line, the courts do and
must have a mechanism to undertake sufficieiit inquiry into the details of the parties'
relationship:43
Contrary to the Objectivists who held sway aiound the turn of the century, the most
important determinant in contract performance - and in the security of performance - is the
relationsh* of the parties to each other.
Similarly, an oil company was held liable for failing to give adequate notice of its
decision to raise prices, despite its standard form reserving that right.44 Macaulay and
others suggest that the court was impressed by the close links between the oil company and
the plaintiff purchaser, and the events leading to the particular dispute: "The Court looked
to the relationship rather than the abstractio ns of formal contract law."45 Thus, on
occasion, the duty of good faith can provide another useful mechanism allowing US courts
to search out and give due weight to the "real deal" behind the "paper deal".46
Several of these applications of the duty of good faith, as in distributorships or
employment, can be seen more generally as controlling unfairness in contractual
relationships where standard forms are particularly common. The same may be inferred by
its application to the control of disclaimer clause: in written contracts. Adams asserts that
4 0 Above n 36,488-490.
41 KMC Corp v Irving Trust Co 757 F 2d 752 (6th Cir 1985).
42 H Hunter 'The Duty of Good Faith and Security of Perfor ·nance" (1993) 6 ICL 19. 23-25.
43 Above n 42,25-26.
44 Nanakuli v Shell Oil 664 F 2nd 772 (9th Cir 1981). Discussed in detail by Burton (below n 184) and particularly
by Dickerson (below, n 68).
45 S Macaulay, J Kidwell, W Whitford and M Galanter ,Contracts: Law in Action (The Michie Company,
Charlottesville. 1995) Vol 2. 367.
4 6 Above n 45,366.
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the duty has been used to control clauses limiting buyers' remedies to repair or replacement,
and limiting liability for consequential losses.47
Unconscionability
In fact, to strike down the offending clauses, the two cases respectively cited rely
primarily on a third example given by Atiyah and Summers: the doctrine of
unconscionability.48 US cases involving distributorships and franchises have also relied
more on this other broad and "content-oriented" standard, set out primarily in UCC §2-
302.49 Furthermore, the noticeable growth of the doctrine of unconscionability has been
underpinned precisely by perceived inadequacies of classical doctrines, such as the "fine
print" doctrine, in controlling unfairness in standard form contracts. Specifically, it was
appreciated that an inquiry into whether the clause was sufficiently brought to one's
attention, and therefore agreed upon, would offer insufficient protection to a party who
happened to have read and understand a particular clause, but who had proceeded to
contract on the basis of that form. Instead, the main problem was seen to be whether that
party really had any real freedom to negotiate standard contract terms - the more
substantive problem of inequality of bargaining power.50
UCC §2-302, epitomising this new concern, was soon criticised as "the Emperor's new
clause", for failing to give clear guidance to US courts.51 In fact, the courts have generally
applied it with care.52 This has been so particularly in disputes between businesses.53
However, even within that category, sufficient cases do apply the doctrine of
unconscionability to ensure it remains another important residual technique for controlling
unfairness in contractual relationships.54 On occasion, the broad wording of the doctrine
of unconscionability has allowed some US courts to strike down contracts on the basis of
4 7 J Adams "The Economics of Good Faith in Contract" (1995) ICL 126, 135-136 (at fn 39).
48 See Eckstein v Cumming 321 NE 2nd 897 at 902-903, and Select Pork v Babcock Swine 640 F 2d 147 at 149. The
former involved the Ohio equivalents of UCC §2-719(1)(a) and §2-302; the latter involved the Iowa equivalent
of UCC §2-719(3).
49 See eg E Jordan 'Unconscionability at the Gas Station" (1978) 62 Minn L Rev 813, 830.
50 Above n 16, 316-319.
51 A Leff "Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause" (1967) 115 U Pa L Rev 485.
52 A Angelo and E Ellinger "Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England,
France, Germany, and the United States" (1992) 14 Loy of LA Intl and Comp L J 455, 504-505. Leff's fatalistic
prediction has thus proved correct (above n 51, 558): "The courts will most likely adjust, encrusting the
irratating aspects of the section with a smoothing nacre of more or less reasonable applications".
53 Above n 16, 331-322.
54 See eg above n 36,798-799.
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severe contractual imbalance, even without some procedural impropriety in the bargaining
process.55 Generally, it has bolstered the resolve of US courts to embark, where necessary,
on a wide-ranging investigation of the contracting parties' relationship.
Thus, the doctrines of good faith and of uncc,nscionability together remain prominent
examples of "content-oriented" standards of validity in US contract law.
3.2 English Law
Good Faith
By contrast, English law remains noticeably reluctant to develop a broad duty of good
faith. This and the ensuing discussion of New Zealand law picks out some broader points of
comparative interest regarding that stance.
Certainly, in Inte*to, Bingham LJ did suggest that cases such as the "ticket cases" went
beyond "a question of pure contractual analysis, w hether one party has done enough to give
the other notice of the incorporation of a term ir. the contract". His Lordship argued that
they were also concerned with the broader question of "whether in all the circumstances it
would in all the circumstances be fair (or reasonable) to hold a party bound".56 Bingham U
linked this latter question to "an overriding principle that in making and carrying out
contracts parties should act in good faith", noting the principle's existence in many legal
systems. However his Lordship noted that "English law has, characteristically, committed
itself to no such overriding principle, but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to
demonstrated problems of unfairness".57 His Lordship then listed a number of such
solutions, such as equity's control of unconscionatile bargains and penalty clauses.
Drawing together various strands that might overlap with, or equate to, a general
principle of good faith in English law is not a recent endeavour.58 Partly in response to
55 Farnsworth notes however that the more frequent approach is to require a mixture of both aspects (above n 16,
334). See also below, text at n 99. Of course, a range of results can often emerge simply because of the scope
for diversity in the US federal system (see J Priestley "A Guide to the Comparison of Australian and United
States Contract Law" (1989) 12 UNSWLR 4,5-9.
5 6 Above, n 19, 439.
5 7 Above n 19, 439.
58 See the pioneer study by R Powell "Good Faith in Contract," (1956) 9 Current Leg Prob 16.
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recent developments in EC law, further excellent work has been undertaken.59 Rather than
review that work, two examples will suggest that the chances of reformulation as a general
duty of good faith in English law nonetheless remain quite slim.
One way of improving those chances may be to give detailed content to such a duty, in
the hope of avoiding criticism that application of the duty is simply a matter of unfettered
judicial discretion.60 However this runs a risk of overly restricting the opportunity to
reconsider the broader contours of the law of contract. For instance, it is now common to
begin by stressing that conceptually a duty of good faith is (or should be) more limited than
a fiduciary duty. Specifically, the duty of good faith is seen as a duty to "act honestly" and
"have regard to the legitimate interests of the other party", whereas the duty on the fiduciary
is to place the interests of the beneficiary above its own.61 A sharp distinction is then
drawn between contract - supposedly centred on self-interest, even if attenuated in
exceptional circumstances by the imposition of a duty of good faith - and fiduciary duty.62
Certainly, fiduciary obligations have differed historically from contractual obligations
as to burden of proof, remedies, and so on.63 For immediate practical purposes, those
distinctions remain important. But there is a risk in then reasoning backwards.
Traditionally, English private law has often developed in this way, which has not
necessarily been detrimental to its certain "rational strength".64 But such an approach can
obscure areas of actual and potential overlap. This can lead to an overly schematic view of
the conceptual bases for each area of law, and thus limit the opportunity for more wide-
ranging reconceptualisations.
59 A revival of interest began in Australia in the late 1980s: H Lucke "Good Faith and Contractual Performance"
in P Finn (ed) Essays on Contract (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1987). This was shortly followed by R Goode's
admonition ("The Codification of Commercial Law" (1988) 14 Mon LR 135, 151): "It is surely high time that
English law adopted a general principle of good faith and cast off its historical shackles."
In England, this led to a more comprehensive overview (J O'Connor, Good Faith in English law, Dartmouth,
Aldershot, 1990), and more attention from J Steyn ("The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law:
A Hair Shirt Philosophy" [1991] Denning LI 131). However the main upsurge in interest has only been evident
since it became clearer that developments in EC law would impact on domestic law (see eg P Duffy "Unfair
Contract Terms and the draft E.C. Directive" (1993) /BL 6D.
60 J Carter and M Furmston "Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiations of Contracts (Part 1)" (1994) 8 ICL 1,5-
6.
61 Above n 60.
62 J Maxton "Contract and Fiduciary Obligation" (1995) Paper presented at the 6th Annual Journal qf Contract Law
Conference: 'The Changing Law of Contract', Auckland, 14-15 August 1995, 5-6.
63 Above n 62,9. L Sealy "Commentary on 'Good Faith and Fairness in Negotiated Contracts"' (1995) 8 /CL 142,
144.
64 F Lawson A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 1955), 141. F
Lawson The Rational Strength of English law (London, Stevens, 1951).
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Thus, a Japanese lawyer might well ask whether it might not be simpler to dispense with
- or at least tone down - some of the traditional incidents of a fiduciary relationship.
Instead, some of those incidents could be absorbed by a broadened duty of good faith. The
overall nature of that duty would then be likely to change, and the resources available to
pursue new directions to expand, with more wide-ranging implications for the development
of contract law as a whole.65
In the US, even those who wish to retain certain distinctions recognise more blurring of
the edges between contractual and fiduciary duty.66 No doubt this has encouraged
supporters of the "economic analysis of contract law", who argue that fiduciary duties
should be subsumed under a contractual analy:,is.67 Alternatively, it could underpin an
extension of "relational contract law".68
By contrast, when considering the principle of good faith in English law, the present
preference for a clear taxonomy of fiduciary and contractual duty stifles more expansive
reformulations of what is, or should be, seen as central to contractual relationships. All
this appears symptomatic of a wider uneasin€·ss in the formal English law tradition
towards more substantive legal reasoning.
A second difficulty is apparent from another recent review of areas where the notion of
good faith may be immanent within the English law tradition. Waddams argues that there is
inadequate justification for a wider duty of good faith.69 His main criticism is that its
ordinary meaning would seem to lead English ,courts into excessive consideration of a
party's subjective intentions or motives. This c-iticism can also be seen as a reaction,
65 As mentioned below (text at n 114 and 115), Article 1(2) has developed a function that is broadly seen as
"equitable", prompting wider jurisprudential debate.
66 D DeMott "Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation" (1988) Duke U 879,896-897,901,906-
911.
67 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, "Contract and Fiduciary Duty" (1993) 36 J kw & Econ 425, 427.
68 C Dickerson ("From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty, and Permitted Harm" (1995) 22 Fla
State Uni L Rev 955, 958-9) argues that "good faith and fiduciary duty represent application of the same
parameters to facts at opposite ends of a single continuum", criticising the tendency to stress discontinuity.
Furthermore, she suggests that one key parameter is the extent to which the structure of the relationship creates
power and conflict of interest in the actor (subject to one of Ihese duties) compared to the other party. The other
parameter which she believes has been somewhat lost fror, view is the harm perceived and imposed on that
other party. This theory arguably opens the way to a "rE lational contract" analysis of the structure of the
relationship and its inherent norms. See eg I Macneil, "Values in Contract: Internal and External" 78 NWULR
340. See also R Gordon "Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law"
(1985) Wisc L Rev 565. However, as noted by J Carter and M Furmston ("Good Faith and Fairness in the
Negotiations of Contracts (Part 2)" (1995) 9 ICL 93, 119) "the relational feature of contract is not well
developed in either Australia or England" - even less so, in New Zealand.
69 S Waddams "Good faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations" (1995) 9 /CL 55.
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representative of a formal approach, against a more content-oriented standard, whose
contours would have to be fleshed out, and which might require the English legal system to
undertake more substantive reasoning - even on occasion inquiring into matters subjective
to the parties.
Waddams instead proposes that the areas reviewed are and should be controlled merely
by two principles: protection of reasonable expectations, and unconscionability. Hence he
criticises Bingham LJ's suggestion, in the Inte*to case, that the doctrine of
unconscionability might be built up into a wider notion equivalent to a duty of good faith.70
But this advocacy of a broadened doctrine of unconscionability is premised on a rejection of
what might be even broader content-oriented standard, a general duty of good faith.
Furthermore, the availability of other means of protecting reasonable expectations has not
prevented the development of such a duty in US law.71
Unconscionable Bargains and Undue Influence
Waddams' alternative proposal of an expanded notion of unconscionability meets with
the difficulty that its English law variant has been characterised by piecemeal and limited
development.72 This has important practical results. For instance, claims of an
unconscionable bargain are highly unlikely to be given much consideratin in cases
involving businesses, in contrast to the residual role of unconscionability in the US even in
this category. English law's more restricted scope, both historically and in current practice,
is thus another indication of its comparative uneasiness about content-oriented standards
of validity.
Any consideration of unconscionability under English law should in turn take into
account the doctrine of undue influence.73 In practice, many cases involve discussion of
both.74 Characteristically, however, English law has again respected the historical
development of undue influence as a doctrine separate from unconscionability and other
equitable doctrines, again with historically separate remedies. For instance, Bundy is well
known for the suggestion by Lord Denning MR that these doctrines might be drawn together
70 Above n 69, 61.
71 Above, text at n 42.
72 Above n 69,460-472.
73 In US law, the expansion of a very broad notion of unconscionability, together with the expansion of the
doctrine of economic duress (above n 16, 286), works to reduce the scope of application, and theoretical and
practical relevance, of undue influence.
74 See eg Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, 337.
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by "a single thread ... 'inequality of bargaining power"'.75 This new and broadly worded
concept is, if anything, even more content-oriented than either unconscionability or undue
influence. But Lord Denning's reformulation has been firmly put to rest.76
More recently, the question has been raised again as to whether and how to delimit the
doctrine of undue influence. But the primary orthodox distinction is vigorously reasserted.
Undue influence is said to focus on the plaintiffs vitiated consent; unconscionability, on the
defendant's overreaching or exploitation of the plaintiff.77
The impetus for this revival of interest is a s€ ries of cases culminating in two decisions
of the House of Lords.78 They involve a fairly common situation, and are thus of clear
practical importance. But they have also led to c inceptual difficulties, partly because they
involve three, rather than two parties. Typically, the defendant (such as a wife) alleges that
the wrongdoer (the husband) has unduly influenced her into entering into a transaction
with a third party (the defendant bank), to the scle benefit of the wrongdoer. At first sight,
the approach taken by the House of Lords seems bold, a more substantive departure from
weighty earlier precedent. For instance, in Pitt. it was doubted whether the doctrine of
undue influence should be restricted, just because another equitable doctrine is arguably
applicable.79 Further, the requirement that the defendant establish "manifest disadvantage"
was abolished.80
Nevertheless, limits are also apparent. The test to decide whether the bank should be
held to be "tainted", by constructive notice of the husband's undue influence, was whether
"the transaction is on itsjace not to the financial advantage of the wife".81 Admittedly, the
House of Lords was impressed by the need to prornote certainty by setting a bright line rule -
75 Above n 74,337. Interestingly, his Lordship had adverted to American law during argument (above n 74,
333).
76 National Westminister Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 708 (also cited by Atiyah and Summers, above n 9,
51). See also J Beatson 'The Common Law Today" (1991) IBL 78, 80.
77 N Chin and P Birks "On the Nature of Undue Influence" in J Beatson and D Friedman (eds) Good Faith and Fault
in Contract Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), Approved by J Beatson "Innovations in Contract: An English
Perspective" in P Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), Vol 2, 128, 139.
78 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1993] 3 WLR 786, CIBC Mortgages Plc v Att & Anor [1993] 3 WLR 802.
79 Pitt, above n 78,808-809.
80 Certainly if actual undue influence is established, and perhaps even in cases where undue influence can be
presumed (Att above n 78,807-809). See A Berg, "Wives, Guarantees - Constructive Knowledge and Undue
Difference" [1994] LMCLQ 34, 38.
81 O'Brien, above n 78,798 (emphasis added). Hence the Hoise of Lords found that the agreement could be set
aside against the bank in O'Brien, where the wife gave security to secure a loan to her husband's company; but
not in Pitt, where she gave the security to obtain a loan jointly with her husband.
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the "face" of the transaction. It also overtly aimed to set a test which reflected "the current
requirements of society". That included the policy argument that joint loans should not be
impugned because this would discourage such loans, to the detriment of the "average married
couple".82 "Certainty", and particularly "social needs", can indicate more content-oriented
standards. However, it is revealing that further policy arguments were not advanced to
determine those assumed social needs, and that the "face" of the transaction is proving
problematic.83 Also, limiting the analysis to "financial" benefit excuses the courts from
looking into the more intangible - even subjective - aspects of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the "wrongdoer". That self-imposed restriction also signals a more formal
approach.84 Lastly, the decision in O'Brien to set aside only part of the impugned security -
a type of "half measure" - may also be seen as more substantive.85 But subsequent cases
restored doctrinal purity, namely an "all or nothing" remedy.86 This implies a formal
reaction.
3.3 New Zealand Law
Good Faith
Many of the fears of English lawyers about introducing the notion of a general duty of
good faith would be shared by their New Zealand counterparts.
Admittedly, in a short reaction to Waddams' critique, Sir Robin Cooke indicated
(extrajudicially) that:
A distinct possibility is that the common law of contract, at least in some at least of its national
versions, would unhesitatingly accept the proposition in the Restatement (2nd) of Contract,
§205, on good faith], embodying as that does an elementary human notion.
82 Pitt, above n 78, 811.
83 S Goo "Enforceability of Securities and Guarantee after O'Brien" (1995) 45 0/LS 125,131. A Lawson "0'Brien
and its Legacy: Principle, Equity and Certainty?" (1995) 54 CLJ 280, 286 and 288.
84 For instance a more content-oriented test might have been: "whether the transaction is unreasonable to the wife
in the light of the particular benefits she obtained from her relationship, and for the wider community". Or,
more simply, whether the transaction was against "good faith" or "public order and good morals" (see below,
text at n 134-136 and n 161-163).
85 W Young "Half Measures" (1981) 81 Colum L Rev 19.
8 6 Lawson, above n 83, 284.
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Further, Sir Robin seems to have implied ttiat Waddams' particular fears, of thereby
making contract law too subjective, were overstated.87 However one cannot make too much
of either suggestion.88
Similarly, in Livingstone,89 Thomas J supported Bingham LJ's attempt to unearth from
disparate strands of the law controlling unfair cc,ntracts something amounting to a general
duty of good faith. Indeed, His Honour was prepared to go further, arguing that:90
I would not exclude from our [New Zealand] cornmon law the concept that, in general, the
parties to a contract must act in good faith in making and carrying out the contract ... [Lord
Mansfield's] tradition was never swamped in the United States as it was in England by the
formalism of the 19th and 20th centuries. But the principle has survived, I suggest, as the
latent premise of much of our law relating to formation and performance of contracts.
After presenting examples from New Zealand contract law, his Honour concluded that
either his or Bingham U's "... principle is influential in deciding the question of whether it
would in all the circumstances be fair (or reasonable) to hold a party bound by any
conditions, or by a particular condition, of an unusual and stringent nature".91
However, Thomas J added these "general considerations" to the main reasoning in the
case. Further, the latter reasoning itself contained an alternative argument that has been
criticised as reintroducing the doctrine of fundarriental breach. Consequently, although this
case is unlikely now to be directly overruled, its €·ffect as precedent is likely to be restricted
to its more traditional analysis: interpreting the term in question as ambiguous and thus to
be construed contra proferentem.92 Finally, a New Zealand commentator has recently
criticised "unjustified generalisations", giving as one example the very "generalisation from
the defences of fraud and unconscionability to a positive requirement of good faith,
87 Above n 3,9. Sir Robin pointed out that "the difficulty of peering into the human mind leads to something close
to an objective standard of good faith", and later that "in default of reliable evidence of actual motive, objective
standards would be applied". This might be interpreted as leaving open the possibility of establishing and
arguing a party's subjective intentions, in appropriate cases.
88 The former merely involves a "distinct possibility". The latter may require too much reading between the lines,
particularly given New Zealand courts' noticeable reluctar ce recently to look into subjective factors even when
clearly established or at least strongly arguable. See McLauchlan (1996), above n 1.
8 9 Above n 20,237.
90 Above n 20,237-238.
91 Above n 20, 238.
9 2 Above, n 27. Similarly, although not in the context of exemption clauses, Tompkins J has recently suggested
that the trend of authorities does not support Thomas J' 3 obiter statements regarding a general good faith
obligation in New Zealand contract law (Isis (Europe) Ltd u Llterat Nominees Ltd & Ors, Auckland HC, CP
444/95, 17/11/95).
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particularly in negotiation, which some academics maintain despite denial by the courts".e
The thrust of this criticism might well extend to Thomas J's attempt at generalisation.
Consistently with this sort of criticism, New Zealand commentators are only beginning
to consider the possibilities - and still, at this stage, mostly the perceived limits - in
developing a general duty of good faith in relation to the law of fiduciary obligation.94
Thus, the germ of a general duty of good faith may have now been planted and some
shoots may be emerging.95 But the development of such a new content-oriented standard in
New Zealand contract law appears to face similar obstacles to those encountered in
English law.
Unconscionability and Undue Injluence
The doctrine of unconscionability in New Zealand also faces obstacles to developing a
more substantive orientation. Courts do continue to stress that a finding of
unconscionability involves balancing a range of factors.96 However, lower courts have
93 B Coote, "Contract - An Underview" in B Brown (ed), Contract - An Underview: Souventr at a Valedictory
Lecture 13 (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1995), 26. But cf R Sutton "Commentary on 'Codification,
Law Reform and Judicial Development'" (1995) Paper presented at the 6th Annual Journal of Contract Law
Conference: 'The Changing Law of Contract' (Auckland, 14-15 August 1995), 1.
94 Eg C Rickett Equity in Commerce (NZ Law Society Seminar Paper, Wellington, 1993), 4-6. But see now
McLauchlan (1992, above n 1, 3), and the more extensive investigation by Maxton (above n 62).
95 See for instance the dicta of Fisher J in Eldamos Investments Ltd v Force Location Ltd and Ors, CP 17/94,
Auckland HC, 22/2/95,11. His Honour appeared to have no difficulty in the concept of having to "negotiate
in good faith" stemming from an agreed right either to first negotiations, or to last refusal. As in the US, it may
be that the notion of a general duty of good faith imposed by law may come to be more acceptable once NZ
courts have developed experience and confidence in defining the contours of duties of good faith agreed on by
the parties (Farnsworth, above n 34, 210-212. See also Carter and Furmston, above n 68, 117).
Also, noting the uneasy relationship between a general duty of good faith and fidiciary law, Peterson has
recently advocated imposing a general duty of good faith in tort on insurers and the Accident and
Rehabilitation Compensation and Insurance Corporation when the latter act in bad faith (above n 37,206-
203· Furthermore, he suggests that New Zealand courts' comparative willingness to now allow damages for
mental distress, following a breach of contract, may substitute for such an expanded form of tort liability. In
fact, this new remedial flexibility of New Zealand courts in contract cases, combined with calls for a general
duty of good faith in tort, may eventually result in the recognition of a general duty of good faith in contract.
Jaanese law, for instance, has also come to allow damages for mental suffering due to breach of contract
(extending article 711 of the Civil Code), while still continuing to develop a general duty of good faith in a
variety of contract cases. See Z Kitagawa "Contract Law in General" in Z Kitagawa (ed) Doing Business in
Japan (Matthew Bender, New York, 1980ff) §1.15[3][d]; and below, text at n108-114.
96 Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 NZLR 157, 174 (per Richardson J).
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recently latched on to the set of factors and weightings conveniently presented by Tipping J
in Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd.97
The factors parallel those culled by Chen-Wishart from a compendious review of
Commonwealth case law on unconscionability.98 However, some of her bolder
observations have not been developed by New Zealand courts. For instance, although her
work has been instrumental in reinstating "contractual imbalance" or "substantive
unfairness" as a factor whose importance tends to be hidden from view, that factor remains
limited. At most, it acts as a presumption of overall unconscionability, or diminishes the
degree of other "procedural" elements needed (the so-called "sliding scale").99 Yet Chen-
Wishart also pointed out that a truly exceptional contractual imbalance may be conclusive
in finding unconscionability.100 That point was nc,t taken up even in the Law Commission's
draft scheme, proposed in 1990, and itself perceived as going too far regarding the role of
contractual imbalance.101 Nor have the courts been keen on the notion of looking into non-
financial or subjective factors in determining the c egree of contractual imbalance.102 Lastly,
New Zealand courts are still extremely unlikely to find unconscionability in cases
involving commercial parties.103
Similarly, the contours of undue influence rern ain quite clearly delimited. New Zealand
courts have adopted the framework set out by th,3 House of Lords in Pin and O'Brien, but
9 7 [1992] 1 NZLR 449, 460-1. For instance, this restatement was invoked - if not rigorously applied - in Harlick v
ASB Bank Ltd [1995] 5 NZBLC 103,675.
98 M Chen-Wishart Unconscionable Bargains (Butterworths, Wellington, 1989)
99 See eg Bowkett, above n 97, 461.
100 Above n 98, 106-107. Admittedly, mostly Canadian or older English authority is cited. But this still
contrasts with the more forthright recognition of this possibility in the US (above n 55) and particularly in
Japan (below 150a).
101 New Zealand Law Commission Unfair" Contracts (Law Commission Preliminary Paper No 11,
Wellington, 1990). D McLauchlan "Unfair Contracts - The Law Commission's Draft Scheme" [1991] NZ Recent
L Rev 311, 321-2.
102 Cf above n 98,54-6. For instance, see Bowkett (above n 97, 461), Gallen J in the High Court in Snee (above
n 96, 162.) But cf Richardson J in Snee, above n 96, 174.
103 Cf above n 98,35. See eg Walmsley v Christchurch C,4 Council [1990] 1 NZLR 199. In addition, a review
of the case law suggests that unconscionability is often raised by a commercial party who is obviously
clutching at a last straw or is quite unmeritorious. (An example of the latter is the unsuccessful defendant in
Forthwith Shelf Co No 95 Ltd v Alexander & Ors, CP 173/94, Wellington High Court, Ellis J, 4/8/95, The
author is grateful to Mr John Wild QC for bringing this case to my attention, although of course this reading of
the judgment remains the author's.) A vicious circle can be created, whereby precedents accumulate against the
application of the doctrine in commercial settings, followed by even more unmeritorious attempts to invoke it.
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have usually managed to dismiss pleas of undue influence raised against financiers.104
Certainly, the High Court's decision in ASB Bank v Harlick focused on the financier's
improper conduct, and therefore implied that the law of unconscionable bargains is
subsuming that of undue influence. But critics have argued against this tendency to develop
an overarching concept in this way, somewhat bemused by a more explicit and ambitious
attempt to do so in the New South Wales Court of Appeal recently.
105 Undue influence
doctrine's orthodox focus on voluntariness of the complainant's consent is reaffirmed, to
distinguish it from the law of unconscionable bargains.106
Thus, as with the suggestion of an overriding duty of good faith, New Zealand lawyers
appear cautious about releasing a new standard, broad and content-oriented, into the
neatly ordered realm of contract law doctrine. That is a hallmark of a more formal
system. 106a
104 See Tilialo v Contractors Bonding Ltd (unreported, CA 50/93, 15/4/94), and the reversal of Harlick (above n
97) in ASB Bank Ltd v Harlick & Anor (unreported, CA 46/95, 6/12/1995).
The latter decision is likely to act as a significant brake on arguing similar cases in New Zealand courts, and
hence to further doctrinal debate. The judgment notes (at p13) that the appeal was brought by the bank "out of
concern for the precedent impact of the judgment in the Court below". The Court of Appeal reversed the High
Court's finding of presumed undue influence, on the evidence it alone heard, instead taking a robust view of
what constitutes a normal family relationship.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal remains on record for requiring manifest disadvantage even in cases of
actual undue influence (Snee, above n 96, 166), although this has recently been criticised (C Callaghan,
"Manifest Disadvantage in Undue Influence: An Analysis of its Role and Necessaity" (1995) 25 VUWLR 289).
105 C Rickett and D McLauchlan "Undue Influence, Financiers and Third Parties: A Doctrine in Transition or
the Emergence of a New Doctrine?" [1995] NZ L Rev 328, 332-336.
106 Above n 105, 336-337 and 349-350. In ASB Bank Ltd v Harlick & Anor (above n 104, 5-7), the Court of
Appeal reemphasised this distinction, refering also to Birks and Chin (above n 77). Callaghan (above n 104,
302-312) also argues advocates victimisation and inadequate consent as the proper principle underlying the
doctrine of undue influence.
Cf R Bigwood "Commentary on 'Undue Influence and Third Parties"' (1995) Paper presented at the 6th Annual
Journal of Contract Law Conference: 'The Changing Inw of Contract', Auckland, 14-15 August 1995, 9. Bigwood
argues that undue influence should now be reconceptualised as focusing on improper conduct or exploitation.
However, he does not go as far as to propose a conceptual merger with unconscionability. He still points to
"definitional" distinctions (as to presumptions of wrongdoing, etc) and suggests that unconscionability may
remain conceptually distinct in arising from cases of deficiencies in judgmental or "rahonal" capacity. Cf also
Chen-Wishart, above n 98, 91-93, 35-44.
106a However the proposal to extend the doctrine of a duty of care in equity, as an alternative means to find
financiers liable, could be seen as more substantive. One perceived advantage is to "avoid the all or nothing
remedial response based on the inherent proprietary aspects of the notice doctrine" (above n 105, 348-349). See
above n 86. But also cf above, text at n 63-64.
UNFAIR CONTRACTS - FORM AND SUBSTANCE 269
3.4 Japanese Law
By contrast, at least at first sight, Japanese contract law appears distinctly open to
content-oriented standards of validity in this field. Thus the analysis must begin with the
hypothesis that Japanese law exhibits a more sub::tantive orientation along this dimension.
In fact, a closer analysis shows that Japanese law has been slow to develop such standards,
particularly in regulating unfair contracts on stan,iard forms.
As mentioned above, two of the Dial Q2 cases opened the way to striking down an
onerous clause. One view of the Okayama District Court case, in particular, is that it opens
the way to more direct consideration of its "unreasonableness". Although still talking of
"interpretation" of the parties' "intentions", it wa.; apparently prepared to read the clause
down to the point of declaring it unenforceable, even if it could be held to be as clear as
NTT had asserted.107 However, particularly from a US perspective, one might have
expected a more direct challenge to such onerous clauses in standard form contracts, relying
expressly on a general standard similar to good fa ith or "unconscionability", rather than the
more classical technique of "interpretation".
Article 1(2): The Duty of Good Faith
In fact, the broad duty of good faith set out in article 1(2) of the Civil Code has been
invoked to justify techniques of contract "interpretation" which sometimes seem to derogate
from even the most clearly expressed intentions of the parties. However, the focus is still
ostensibly on intentions, and such derogation is increasingly criticised.108 This suggests a
formal reaction. It also makes it less surprising tiat in fact article 1(2) was not expressly
relied on in the Dial Q2 cases, against the clause in question.
On the other hand, article 1(2) was specifically - and successfully - argued on a further
point, namely the effect of a second clause in the NTT standard form contract. That clause
provided for NTT to claim a charge itself, for the use of the telephone in accessing the
information provider. The Osaka District Coul·t expressly decided that it would be
contrary to "good faith" to allow NTT to rely on it. Once again, a major reason was that the
public was not aware of how charges might easily escalate. But the court also called on
article 1(2) as further grounds to justify the extra step of tying the second clause to the first,
which provided for the new service in association with the information provider and
which had already been "interpreted" as unenforceable. Thus, the invokation of article 1(2)
to bolster the court's interpretation of onerous contract terms can still be seen as requiring a
focus on "interpretation" of the parties' intentions - again, a formal approach. Alternatively,
107 Above n 25.
108 Above n 26. See also K Yamamoto in H Endo, H Miz imoto, Z Kitagawa and S Ito (eds.) Minpo Chukai
[Commentary on the Civil Code] 37 (Seirin Shoin, Tokyo, 1989), 52.
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it may indicate a more substantive approach, but one limited by more formal reasoning in
first "interpreting" another closely related clause as not to be strictly enforced.
It is therefore relevant to survey other uses to which article 1 (2) has been put, in
controlling unfair terms particularly on standard forms, to determine whether it acts
overall as a content-oriented standard introducing significantly more substantive reasoning
into Japanese contract law.
At first sight, article 1(2) appears highly content-oriented. It simply provides:
The exercise of rights and the performance of duties shall be done in faith [shingi] and in
accordance with the principles of trust [seijitsu].
This seems dangerously broad to a common lawyer, particularly an English or New
Zealand lawyer. In fact, ironically, article 1(2) was an amendment made to the Civil Code in
1947, under the Occupation's pro-democracy reforms. However it has roots in Roman law
and has been shaped by the civil law tradition; the provision itself is closest to article 2(1)
of the Swiss Civil Code.109 Nonetheless, article 1 (2) might seem particularly open to moral
reasoning. The requirement of "trust" (bonnejoi) in article 1134 of the French Civil Code is
similar (albeit limited in scope to performance of agreements), and aimed to reinforce the
moral principle of pacta sunt servanda.110 Furthermore, even set out in the corresponding
broad duty of Treu und Glauben in performance of obligations articles 242 and 157 of the
German Civil Code - the original "emperor's clauses"111 - requires consideration of "trade
practices".112 Yet in Japan, from its inception in pre-1947 case law and academic writing,
the duty of good faith has been taken beyond the individual's moral imperative to faithfully
perform assumed obligations. It has extended to faithful enforcement of rights, and hence
into more general consideration of socio-political factors and how private law relations
should be developed.113 Nevertheless, whether as a window into individual morality or
wider socio-political considerations, the wording of article 1 (2), its pre-1947 antecedents,
109 M Yasunaga in T Taniguchi and K Ishida (eds) Chushaku Minpo [Commentary on the Civil Code] 71
(Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1988), 71-74.
110 Above n 109, 71. But cf J Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Law (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1991), 217-227, arguing that the Code was not founded on natural law concepts, nor on any other
recognisable philosophical principles.
111 So dubbed ("konigliche Paragraphen") by W Hedemann in 1910, because the duty rapidly came to be
applied not just as regards performance of obligations, but also as regards the enforcement of rights (above n
109, 72).
112 Verkehrssitten.
113 K Yamamoto "Shingizoku, Kojoryozoku [The Duty of Good Faith, and Public Order and Good Morals]"
(1992) 144 Hogaku Kyoshitsu 42,43. Further, as with Article 90, the duty of good faith has also appealed to jon'
(below n 152).
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and indeed some developments immediately after World War II: all offered a comparatively
wide avenue for more substantive reasoning in Japanese contract law.
On the one hand, some connection between the duty of good faith and individual
morality remains apparent. One of the duty's generally accepted functions is an equitable
one, covering cases that overlap with Anglo-American law's equitable principles of "clean
hands", laches, and estoppel - the duty not to act so as to contradict one's earlier acts.114
This leads to fruitful jurisprudential discussion even among civil law professors in Japan
as to the role of such a function in these cases, in the context of an overarching duty of good
faith.115 Furthermore, for instance in the estoppel cases, it leads to interesting attempts to
reconcile the more subjective focus on one party s prior and subsequent conduct per se, as
opposed to the more objective approach of protecting the other party's reasonable
expectations stemming from the first party's prior acts.116
On the other hand, although the duty of good faith is broadly worded, it is hardly
boundless. In fact, a second function of the duty of good faith in Japanese law has been
simply to expand on the often rather sparse provisions and concepts of the Civil Code.117
This function is particularly evident as regards performance of obligations. Similarly to US
law, for instance, it applies a type of de minimus doctrine to performance,118 and supports
the notion of exemptio.119 The function is also e„ident regarding the exercise of rights, as
when the duty of good faith takes into account the obligee's (right-holder's) duty to
114 Above n 108, 44-50.
115 Above n 108, 39-41. This contrasts with the tendency of English and New Zealand lawyers to delimit
boundaries of equitable principles vis-a-vis any suggested duty of good faith, without embarking on wider
jurisprudential inquiry. Above, text at n 61-62.
116 For instance, in some intended cases the issue can tum solely on the former question, with strong criticism
directed at the first party's subjective behaviour. However, in other cases, a type of "sliding scale" may be
adopted: less strongly objectionable behaviour may be supplemented by some lesser reliance by the other party,
to make out a breach of this aspect of the duty of good faith (above n 108, 45). Both lines of reasoning may
well be found in other cases involving the duty of good faith. This might allay Waddams' fears (above, text at n
69) that recognising such a general duty in the English law tradition would involve particular difficulties and
risks for courts having to deal with one party's subjective motivations,
117 Above n 108, 57-62. More generally, see Z Kitagawa Minpo Koyo (1) - Minpo Sosoku [Civil Code Lectures
(1): General Part] (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1993) 18.
118 This restricts what constitutes a breach, under the reg uirement of article 415 to perform "in accordance with
the tenor and purport of the obligation", and the grounds for termination under article 541.
119 Article 533. Cf the concept of "concurrent conditions" in Anglo-American law: G Treitel Remedies for Breach
of Contract: A Comparative Account (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), 276-285.
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cooperate in the obligor's performance, to cure a minor defect in the latter's notification of
readiness to perform.120
More ambitious, perhaps, is a willingness at times to invoke the duty of good faith to
develop new conceptual categories, such as the notion of "duties incidental to the obligation
of performance" (fuzitigimu) or even wider "duties of protection" of life and property
(hogogimu).121 But these still stem from a fleshing out of the nature of performance
obligations, and have been met in turn by complex conceptual reformulations by Japanese
academics. Also noteworthy is the recent emergence in the case law of a pre-contractual
duty of culpa in contrahendo (keiyaku teiketsujo no kashitsu), even though - as in the UCC -
Article 1(2) refers only to performance of obligations.122 But again the contours of this
doctrine have now been thoroughly discussed and reconceptualised.
123
It is also widely admitted that the duty of good faith can have broader functions, namely
in "correcting" and "creating" law beyond that provided for in the Code. An example of the
latter is the development of the "doctrine of changed circumstances" (ijo henko no
gensoku).124 This doctrine was created to cover situations perceived as going beyond the
notion of "non-imputable impossibility" provided for by the Civil Code framework. But the
various requirements for invoking the doctrine, and to a lesser extent its effect as relief from
obligations, were largely established well before 1947.125 Further, the doctrine witnessed a
peak in the economic and social turmoil immediately following World War II. Overall, it
has found little favour in Japanese courts.126 This pattern supports the general observation
that the more overtly "creative" function of the duty of good faith has been developed rather
restrictively in Japanese law.127 Similarly, a doctrine which developed to limit termination
of leases to "breakdown in the trust relationship" (shinraikankei hakai no hori), seems to
serve a more wide-ranging "correcting", a perhaps even "creative" function128. But this
120 Cf article 493 proviso.
121 Above n 108, 54-55.
122 Above n 108, 56-57.
123 S Kawakami "Japan" in E Hondius (ed) Precontractual Liability 205 (Kluwer, Deventer, 1991).
124 Above n 108, 51-52.
125 H Kubo "A Comparative Study of the Basic Concept of Impossibility under Japanese, American and
Uniform Law" [1991] Sandai Hogaku 567.
126 Nottage (1996), above n 1.
127 Above n 108, 42.
128 Cf the basic right to terminate "at will" for non-performance (article 541); Yamamoto, above n 113, 50.
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doctrine has attracted much academic comment and attempts to restrict its scope - to clarify
the types of situations in which it could be invoked, and on what specific grounds. 129
Admittedly, this latter doctrine has seen a revival in new types of contractual
relationships, particularly distributorships and franchise contracts.130 In this run of cases,
often drawing on the duty of good faith, termineition has generally come to be permitted if
there has been a "transactional breakdown"; but mostly subject to an obligation to give
reasonable notice and, often, to pay some compensation.131 Furthermore, the inquiry of the
Japanese courts into the "transactional breakdown" can be extensive. For instance, in 1977
the Tokyo District Court held against a wholesal er who attempted to terminate a retailer's
contract, unilaterally and without notice, despite its having no fixed term. The court held
that: 132
where there is no relevant serious reason, a wholesaler who requests termination merely for
his own benefit, or who stops delivery of foods, is in fact forcing the collapse of the retailer.
The request for termination in effect damages the retailer's right to operate, and violates the
wholesaler's obligations to act in good faith [article 1 (2)] and in accordance with public
welfare and good morals.
Taylor cites this passage and this case as indicating the scope that Japanese courts have
to "... scan the agreement for its impact on the weaker party - the fairness principle at work",
giving the courts "... a basis for examining the actual nature of the parties' relationship".133
Of particular comparative interest is that the court signalled a desire to temper the
terminating party's pursuit of self-interest. It thus indicates a preparedness, or at least a
possible avenue, for Japanese courts to occasionally take into consideration subjective
motivation as well as more objective factors. But, as with its precursor doctrine of
"breakdown in the trust relationship", this particillar manifestation of the duty of good faith
may well have already spent its primary iinpetus in injecting significantly more
"substantive" reasoning into contemporary Japanese contract law.
The same might be said of a further set of cases that have been dealt with under the
principle of good faith, namely a guarantee given by a third party to the creditor for the
benefit of the primary debtor. Underlying these cases is not only an awareness that the
129 Above n 108, 50-51, 62-64.
130 V Taylor "Continuing Transactions and Persistent Myths: Contracts in Contemporary Japan" (1993) 19
MULR 352-398, 380-383.
131 Above n 130, 383-384.
132 Above n 130, 383.
133 Above n 130, 383.
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relationship between guarantor and principal debtor can be emotionally charged and
therefore risky for the guarantor - an awareness which also underlies recent English undue
influence cases such as O'Brien and Pitt - but also a willingness to inquire into, and
directly police, the actions of the guarantor.134 Thus, for instance, in 1932 it was held that
if a guarantee was for an indefinite term, the guarantor's obligations ceased when notice of
termination had been given after a reasonable period, but the creditor continued to supply
credit to the primary debtor. However, this sort of case is seen either as illustrating another
creative use of article 1(2), or in more traditional terms, as a problem of interpretation of the
contract.135 A similar ambiguity is apparent in another type of case where a right of
immediate termination was recognised due to an extreme change in circumstances in the
primary debtor's financial situation that the guarantor was held not have been able to
foresee. Once again, the court in question relied on the duty of good faith, but other courts
have taken the more traditional route of interpreting the parties intentions.136 Furthermore,
although a similar result was reached in cases of guarantees of a lease contract, the
difficulty of arguing sufficient changes of circumstances in Japanese law must be
remembered.137
Uchida sees these types of cases as a good example of Japanese law's willingness to
develop new concepts to recognise underlying social concerns, namely protection of the
guarantor.138 But we have seen that they can be approached from a more formal perspective.
Also, as Uchida goes on to admit, a significant proportion of these cases - certain guarantees
given by employees - quickly came to be regulated by special legislation.139 Uchida argues
that this legislation was distinctive in allowing for wide judicial discretion.140 However,
the very fact of shifting control of potential contractual unfairness to the legislative arena
tends to impart more "formality" to the system.141 At the very least, it works to restrict more
vigorous growth of the broader doctrine of good faith. In fact, such a restrictive tendency
134 Above n 78. In contrast, English law has been reluctant to pursue the latter possibility (J Phillips
"Guarantees: The Effect of Creditor's Prejudicial Conduct towards the Guarantor" (1990) IBL 325)
135 Above n 108, 60.
136 Or of interpreting Article 589. Above n 108, 60.
137 See the cases cited in Yamamoto, above n 108, 61. Above, text at n 125-126.
138 T Uchida Keiyaku no Saisei [The Rebirth of Contract] *obundo, Tokyo, 1990), 230-231.
139 Employee Guarantees Act (Mi,nom Hosho Ho), Law No. 42, 1933.
140 Above, n 137, 233-235.
141 Atiyah and Summers argue (above n 9,96-97) that by its very nature, legislation tends to have higher
"rank formality", "content formality" and "mandatory formality". But also cf above n 35.
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continues to be evident, as in more recent types of cases where good faith is invoked.142
Lastly, all these types of cases involve third parties. Apparently, the duty of good faith has
not played the major role in directly regulating unfair contract terms between two parties,
in a way that unambiguously points to a tendency towards the highly substantive approach
advocated by scholars such as Uchida.
In sum, the duty of good faith in Japanese law has largely developed incrementally, into
reasonably distinct groups of cases, in a way that - like the "fine print" doctrine - can often
be quite readily encompassed within a formal ap proach. At the same time, it at least allows
courts and commentators a foothold to develop a more substantive approach.143 This
opportunity follows from the broad wording of article 1 (2), its history as both moral
principle and window into socio-political factors, and the sheer quantity of case law
refering to the duty - however much in passing.144 Furthermore, in some of its manifestations
the duty of good faith has been refined in purely commercial cases, making it easier for
Japanese courts to invoke it in other manifest:itions to police contractual relationships
between businesses, as well as those between individuals. Nevertheless, this brief review
suggests that Japanese law has tended to impart less substantive reasoning than its
counterpart in the US. Further evidence of sign ificant "substantive" regulation of unfair
terms in Japanese contract law must be sought elsc:where.
Article 90: "Public Order and Good Morals"
Article 90 is an obvious candidate.145 As wilh article 1(2), it potentially amounts to a
highly content-oriented standard, and hence another mechanism opening the Japanese legal
system to more substantive reasoning. Article 90 provides that:
A juristic act which has for its object such matters as are contrary to public order [oyake no
chitsujo] or good morals [zenryo no.A,zoku] is null and void.
It also has solid roots in the civil law trad ition. However, a comparison with the
corresponding article 138 of the German Civil Code (BGB), for instance, suggests that
article 90 is a more content-oriented standard.
142 These tend to be consumer contracts, where a "creative" function is apparent as the social goal of
promoting of consumer protection. However, once again, some important issues soon came to be covered by
legislation. Above n 108, 64-65.
143 Hence eg Uchida's recent argument that the duty of good faith calls for a version of "relational" contract
theory, underpinned by communitarian moral philosophy. Above n 1, 133-135.
144 Kitagawa, above n 95, §1.07[2][d].
145 So is article 1(3), restricting "abuse of rights" (kenn no ranyo). But this has exercised even less control over
"unfaimess" in contractual relationships. Instead it has been prominent in regulating real property rights. See
eg K Sono and Y Fujioka "The Role of the Abuse of Righl Doctrine in Japan" (1975) 35 la L Rev 1037.
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First, a component common to both article 90 and BGB article 138(1), the standard of
"good morals" (zenryo nofuzoku orgute Sitten), opens the path to consideration of moral
questions. Indeed, its German proponents spoke of gute Sitten as promoting "moral
interests", while critics in Japan argued that what became article 90 would dangerously
conflate morality and law.146
Secondly, however, article 90 adds a second component: "public order" (oyake no
chitsujo). This component was deleted from the first draft for BGB article 138. The draft had
been criticised for its perceived lack of clarity, particularly in the light of its short
history.
147 But supporters had responded that this component could be used to identify
"general interests of the state", relating to fundamental rights inherent in the legal order.148
In fact, this is how it was seen by its proponents when included in article 90 of the Japanese
Civil Code.149 Thus, although inviting a consideration of more objective factors than in the
case of "good morals", the inclusion of the still quite novel component of "public order" also
opened article 90 to more substantive reasoning.
Third, article 90 does not list specific requirements, such as those now contained in BGB
article 138(2): "exploitation of the distressed situation, inexperience, lack of judgmental
ability, or grave weakness of will of another".150 This has led to broader application of
this article, compared to article BGB 138. On the one hand, legal theory and caselaw
development in Japan has interpreted article 90 widely, so as to cover the "usurious"
transactions that BGB article 138(2) had been specifically drafted to cover. On the other
hand, by not listing more specific requirements as in article 138(2), article 90 has been able
to avoid the German law's tendency to interpret those requirements restrictively. Thus, as
with some US unconscionability cases, Japanese courts have allowed relief where there is
146 K Hayashi "Doitsuho ni okeru Ryozokuron to Nihonho no Kojoryozoku [Public Order and Good Morals in
Jaanese Law, and the Theory of Good Morals in German Law]" (1992) 64 Horitsu Jiho 244,245.
147 Dating back only to the French Civil Code of 1804: Above n 146, 246.
148 Above n 146, 247-248.
149 Above n 108, 42.
150 Translation by M Bonell An International Restatement of Contract Law: The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Transnational Juris Publications, Irvington, NY, 1994), 102. These
requirements were in fact broadened by an amendment to the German Civil Code, following the enactment of
the Law on the Regulation of Standardised Contract Terms (AGBGe) on 9 December 1976. Previously,
requirements were defined as exploitation of "the need, carelessness or inexperience of another" (translation by
Angelo and Ellinger, above n 52,483).
Note that the latter translation and ensuing discussion relates to article 138(2) prior to this amendment.
However their main point holds. Despite the amendment, the listing of specific requirements continues to
undermine the development of article 138(2) (see Hayashi, above n 146, 243
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no obvious weakness exploited, but a grossly disproportionate bargain.150a In sum, even a
brief comparison with a similar civil law system generally supports the initial impression
of article 90 as a highly content-oriented standarc[ in Japanese contract law.
This may not have been the framers' original intent. They appear to have taken a
restrictive view of the scope of article 90, seeing it as an exceptional restriction on the
primary principle of party autonomy.151 However, academic commentary soon began to
view article 90 more expansively, as an overriding principle constraining party autonomy.
Similarly, case law soon went beyond questions primarily of individual morality, such as
contracts harming family life, and beyond questic,ns regarding the minimal interests of the
state, such as contracts to further criminal activities. Article 90 began to be invoked as a
means of policing fairness in a wider range of transactions, commonly grouped as usurious.
That category included not just excessive interest charges, but also cases involving certain
employee guarantees (mimoto hosho) and one-sided contract terms. Overall, commentators
largely contented themselves with grouping these cases into such broader categories. As a
common thread, article 90 was seen to turn simply on "social appropriateness" (shakaiteki
datosei), sometimes linked to the even broader standard of "natural reason" Uori).152
However, as with article 1 (2), a closer analysis of reported article 90 cases reveals
limits. A useful illustration is provided by the cases that came to be grouped under the
usurious category, as they can be assumed to have often involved standard forms and
particular unfair contract terms. First, a few employee guarantee cases emerged prior to
World War II, but all but one were unsuccessfitl. These early issues would have been
largely resolved by legislation in 1932.153 Second, a similar pattern is evident in pre-War
cases involving usurious interest rates or excessive liquidated damages clauses. Only 5 out
of 26 were successful, and problems of usurious iIiterest rates were then largely addressed
by the Interest Rate Regulation Law.154 Challenges, to excessive liquidated damages clauses
were no doubt limited by an initially strict approach to the remedy under article 90, namely
150a Above n 146, 247.
151 Above n 113, 42.
152 H Orita "Senzen Hanrei ni okeru Kojoryozoku [Public Oider and Good Morals in Pre-War Caselaw]" (1992)
64 Horitsu Jiho 61. Jori is another civil law concept (Natur der Sache), associated with natural law theory.
However it may also have been interpreted by its early JE.panese proponents in more indigineous terms. In
1875 it arguably achieved the status as another direct "source of law". See H Tanaka Introduction to Japanese
Law 1972), 125, 175-177.
153 Above n 139.
154 Risoku Seigen Ho, Law No. 100, 1954.
278 (1996) 26 VUWLR
total invalidity.155 Third, only 2 of 18 pre-War cases successfully invoked article 90 to
strike down "one-sided clauses". Overall, legislative intervention and a rather strict
approach to article 90 seem to have stunted its initial expansion within this category.
However, even after the introduction of the Interest Rate Regulation Law in 1954,
Nakaya reports that there remained a total of some 185 cases in a roughly similar category
(covering "Indiscretion and Exploitation") through to 1990. These had a success rate of over
50%.156 Many will have involved more challenges to excessive liquidated damages clauses
or "one-sided clauses".157 Matching this development, article 90 has increasingly been
interpreted as allowing for partial invalidation, namely of the offending clause (or part
thereof) rather than the entire contract. This underpins continued attempts to use article 90
to challenge excessive liquidated damages clauses,158 which US and English law have had
to regulate more indirectly by the device of striking down "penalty clauses".159 Nonetheless,
one should not overlook the initially restrictive approach of Japanese courts to this sort of
challenge, nor underestimate the strength of the criticism that they are acting arbitrarily
when drawing the line of partial invalidity. Consequently, the courts may still be reluctant
to support direct challenges to liquidated damages clauses, unless the task is made easier by
other legal grounds or by particular facts.160
Another post-War development of comparative interest in this category has been the
"bar hostess guarantee" cases. At least 11 cases have successfully challenged guarantees of
155 H Nakaya "Sengo Hanrei ni okeru Kojo Ryozoku [Public Order and Good Morals in Post-War Caselaw]"
(1992) 64 Horitsu /iho 73,79.
156 For the period 1955-89, 101 of the 185 successfully invoked article 90. Above n 155, 75.
157 However Nakaya's category appears broader than Orita's pre-War category of "Usurious Acts". It
probably includes the cases like the Tokyo District Court decision cited above (n 132), and almost certainly the
"hostess guarantee" cases (below, text at n 161-163), as Nakaya's remaining category ("Others") contains so
few cases for the relevant period.
158 See eg the agency case discussed by Taylor (above n 130, 389-390), where only 25% of the liquidated
damages amount claimed was awarded.
159 Atiyah and Summers (above n 8, 51) give the regulation of penalty clauses as a further example of a more
content-oriented standard of validity in US contract law. (This is also mentioned in Interfoto and Livingstone,
above n 19 and 20.) Overall, this means of regulation is more "formal", in finding the validity of such clauses
solely in the "source" of the parties' agreement at the time of contracting (see also below n 186). However,
aspects of the US law do appear more "substantive", compared to English law (see eg Treitel, above n 119, 229-
33).
160 For instance, the task of drawing the line and finding a term to be only partially invalidwas made easier in
a recent case in the Kobe District Court (judgment of 20 July, 1992). The court allowed enforcement of only one
half of the lump sum liquidated damages claimed by a franchisor. The court stressed the fact that the franchisor
had subsequently varied an identical contract with another franchisee, agreeing to reduce the liquidated
damages by exactly one half.
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clients' food and drink bills, given by bar hostesses to their managers. The courts have been
critical of managers abusing their superior position, and transferring the risk of non-
payment by clients to their employees, a risk that is perceived as inherently falling on the
managers themselves.161 This in itself is a more substantive approach. But so was the
approach of the Supreme Court in 1986, when it refused to invalidate the contract in
question.162 That decision is seen as justified by the close and special relationship that
existed between the particular hostess and client. This constrasts sharply with the undue
influence cases in the House of Lords, and the unconscionability cases in New Zealand. It
suggests a greater willingness of Japanese courts to delve into the entire relationship -
including its non-financial elements - to determine the actual benefits intended or enjoyed by
the parties in each particular case. Lastly, a flexible approach to achieving more
substantive justice in such cases is evident in other decisions that that allow the hostess to
claim money back from the manager, despite having invalidated the underlying guarantee.163
On the other hand, since 1985 the bar hostess cases hardly figure among reported court
cases.
A final important development in the post-War case law is the increased challenge to
particular "one-sided clauses", especially exemption clauses in standardised agreements. In
1982, an influential commentator urged Japanese courts to invoke article 90 more
vigorously to strike these down. The reasoning was highly substantive: article 90 was a
flexible standard that should move with the times and give more weight to consumer
protection values.164 However, critics pointed out that this proposal ran counter to the
reticence of the courts to invoke article 90 in this area, and reemphasised its traditional
conceptual limits.165
Among those cases that continue to challenge exemption clauses, many have applied
either or both article 90 and the duty of good faith.166 The post-War development of partial
invalidation as a possible remedy under article 90, and its application in more commercial
cases, have encouraged the courts to more actively promote fair dealing between particular
161 Nakaya, above n 155, 75.
162 Judgment of 20 November, 1986.
163 Above n 155, 79-80.
164 I Kato Minpogaku no Rekishi to Kadai [Civil Code History and Issues] (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1982). Professor
Kato was a leading exponent of the 'balancing of interests" methodology in Japanese civil law theory, which is
open to more substantive reasoning. See G Rahn Rechtsdenken und Rechtsau#assung in Japan [Legal Thought
and the Conception of Law in Japan] (C H Beck, Munchen, 1990), 248-264.
165 Above n 108, 104.
166 Such as contracts of carriage: above n 155, 77-78.
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parties.167 This has traditionally been the preserve of the duty of good faith. However such
cross-overs have attracted considerable concern from commentators, who have generally
attempted to reinstate the original conceptual differences between the two articles.168
Furthermore, courts seem careful to respect the fundamentally different legal consequences
provided for in the two articles: article 90 provides for invalidation, whereas article 1(2)
merely limits rights. In particular, for instance, when the consequences of applying former
later prove to be unpalatable, they have switched to applying the latter.
169
Finally, the courts have often dealt with problem areas with potentially widespread
repercussions, such as insurance contract standard forms, with techniques of contract
"interpretation".170 Commentators do note that even "restrictive interpretation" runs into
difficulties when an agreed clause is is absolutely clear; but there is a concern lest
application of article 90 be taken as widespread opprobrium of practices in an industry.171
Overall, the trend in these areas also indicates a formal tendency.
Nakaya points out that the difficulty in drawing a line between article 90 and article
1(2) is reduced in practice, by problem areas being "siphoned off' to be addressed through
legislation as well as techniques of contract interpretation. This also tends to invite a more
formal approach, particularly in Japan where the law-making process in the areas under
review does not seem to have been as politicised as in the US. This strengthens the
conclusion that article 90, like article 1 (2), has not led to quite the degree of substantive
reasoning that might be anticipated from an initial reading. This more formal side to the
development of article 90 may help explain why it has apparently never been invoked in the
Dial Q2 cases. It could be seen as too "aggressive"172 _ or, put more theoretically - as too
direct an application of a content-oriented standard.
4. The General Approach to Legislative Intervention to Control Unfair Contracts
An overall pattern begins to emerge, particularly from the still tentative analysis of the
development of doctrines of good faith and unconscionability. US law prefers a highly
substantive approach. Japanese law takes a substantive approach, tempered by a formal
dimension evident from a closer analysis of actual developments. New Zealand and English
law tend to retain a resolutely formal approach. This pattern seems to be reinforced by each
167 Above n 155, 74. Also recall the 1977 termination case (above, n 132) which applies both articles.
168 See also Y Yamamoto above n 29, 103 and 106-107.
169 Above n 155, 87.
170 Above n 26 Y Yamamoto; above n 29, 103.
171 Above n 29, 107, 103.
172 The author thanks Professor Tsuneo Matsumoto for this phrase.
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legal system's approach to the question of legislative intervention to control unfair
contracts.
More extensive legislation based on broadly worded content-oriented standards of
validity would indicate a more substantive approach. Piecemeal, more tightly drafted
legislative intervention would indicate a more formal approach, particularly in the light of
Atiyah and Summers' point that legislation by its very nature tends to promote other
dimensions of formality within a legal system.173
The United States
It is therefore significant that the development of US law in this field remains largely
driven by general doctrines of good faith and unconscionability. Certainly, as mentioned
above, legislation has been enacted at both state and federal levels to regulate particularly
acute problems with specific types of contracts, commonly in standard form, such as
distributorships and employment contracts. But that legislation retained noticeably content-
oriented standards, built on earlier caselaw developments, and is itself the result of and
part of a visibly political process.174 Otherwise, there is general satisfaction with what
remains, on the whole, a comparatively broad and substantive approach. This can also be
seen in aspects of the ongoing work by the Study Group of the Permanent Editorial Board
(PEB) on amendments to article 2 of the UCC.
First, its Executive Report did not recommend any significant changes to the present §2-
316(2), which requires that written disclaimers be "conspicuous". Its interim report had
tried to dilute this requirement, by adding that even if the disclaimer could not be said to be
conspicuous, it would be valid if the buyer knew of it.175 It is not surprising that this
proposition was deleted in the Executive Report. US commentators' early appreciation of
the problem of how to deal with such an alert - but "weaker"- contracting party
underpinned the later emergence of more direct regulation of unfair terms under broad
standards of unconscionability, not just by focusing on the parties' agreement.176
173 Above n 141.
174 Above text at n 35-40.
175 H Sono "UCC Dai Ni Hen (HanbaO no Kaisei Sagyo ni miru Gendai Keiyaku Ho no tchi-Doko [The Revision of
UCC Article 2: FEB Study Group Reports, Llewellyn's Rich Legacy, and Modern Contract Law] (1)" (1994) 44
Hokudai Hogaku Ronshu 837,886.
176 Above, text at n 50.
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Second, there was little momentum by the PEB Study Group to overhaul the broad
standards of unconscionability laid down in the UCC.177 Indeed, its Preliminary Report
proposed that §2-308 be transferred to the more general Article 1, as a guiding principle for
the whole of the UCC, not just for Article 2 on sales.178 Furthermore, the majority rejected
the proposition that the provision differentiate between consumer sales and sales between
merchants.179 This tends to confirm the impression that unconscionability in US law
remains available as a residual technique for controlling unfairness, even in commercial
situations. 180
Finally, the role of the duty of good faith has also been largely confirmed. The Executive
Summary confirms that rejection under §2-601 must be in good faith, in derogation of the
strict "perfect tender rule".181 A minority even suggested more generally that the revised
UCC adopt a type of "material breach" framework.182 Furthermore, the majority insisted
that termination of continuing supply contracts "at will", under §2-309, be done in good
faith.183 There is some attempt to reemphasise the objective aspects of the inquiry, but that
itself can be substantive in orientation as well.184 Thus, the duty of good faith under any
revised UCC article 2 promises to remain an broad "content-oriented" standard playing a
significant part in contemporary US contract law.
England
Atiyah and Summers admit that the enactment of the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977
(the UCTA) does import more content-oriented standards of validity into this area of
177 Cf J Murray "The Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism" (1994) 35 William and Mary L Rev 1447,
1496-1497.
178 The effect of §2-719, as a basis for invalidating exemption clauses regarding personal injury, is also
largely retained in the Executive Report: H Sono "UCC Dai Ni Hen (Hanbai) no Kaisei Sagyo ni miru Gendai
Keiyaku Ho no Ichi-Doko [The Revision of UCC Article 2: PEB Study Group Reports, Llewellyn's Rich Legacy,
and Modern Contract Law] (2)" (1994) 44 Hokudai Hogaku Ronshu 1293, 1299-1300.
179 Above n 178, 1307.
180 Above text at n 54.
181 However it proposes to retain the rule in consumer sales, as a protective measure (above n 175, 885-886).
182 Proponents alluded to the similar 'fundamental breach" concept in article 25 of the Vienna Sales Convention
183 Also, notice must be given or the bargain may be held unconscionable under §2-309(3) (above n 178,
1330).
184 The Preliminary Report proposes to expand §2-103 (refering to the more "objective" indicators of fair
dealing in the trade) to encompass non-merchants as well as merchants, and to introduce more objective
indicators into §1-201 (presently refering to the more "subjective" indicator of "honesty"). Above n 178, 1335-
1336. Also see S Burton "Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View" (1994) 35 William and
Mary L Rev 1533, 1561-1563.
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English contract law, in particular through its test of "reasonableness" for exemption
clauses.185 However they suggest that the UCTA will continue to be interpreted in the
narrow, formal fashion representative of the English law tradition. It is certainly important
not to over-estimate the role of the UCTA in changing the tenor of English contract law in
this field.
As Adams and Brownsword admit, the scope (or "sweep") of the UCTA remains
restricted by requiring "reasonableness" of the clause to be tested when the contract was
concluded.186 By directing the focus of inquiry to that point of time, to a more specific
"source", this can be seen as a formal restriction. Furthermore, they argue that the UCTA
implies a restriction in "pitch":187
judges should try to infuse some degree of consistency and generality into their rulings and, in
particular, should avoid a one-off approach to the regulation of commercial standard form
exemptions.
If this is so, it can be seen as restricting the scope for inquiry into more subjective
considerations, an additional avenue for more substantive reasoning. Lastly, Adams and
Brownsword do point out that one strand of the caselaw may be taking a more expansive
view. But they criticise this development as leaving too much judicial discretion, and
highlight a more restrictive strand in the case law as well.188
The restrictions of the UCTA can be further brought out by a brief comparison with the
EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.189 The UCTA is largely limited to the
regulation of exemption clauses, not the broad spectrum of clauses covering agreed remedies.
Nor does it extend to insurance contracts, a major category of consumer contract.190
In turn, the Directive has its limitations. First, article 5 requires terms to be "plain" and
"intelligible", and construed contra proferentem. But Collins argues that this can justified by
the more limited notion of "market failure", and sees article 5 as "the formal test" required by
185 Above n 9,52. Foreign observers have tended to see the UCTA in this light: see Katz (above n 6,4-5). Also,
in Intedoto (above n 19, 439), Bingham U alludes to the UCTA as another "piecemeal solution" to the general
problem of unfaimess in English law.
186 J Adams and R Brownsword 'The Unfair Contract Terms Act : A Decade of Discretion" (1988) 104 LQR 94,
116.
187 Above n 186, 116.
188 Above n 186, 97-99, 104-105.
189 93/13/EEC. Brought into force in England by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994
(S.I.1994 No 3159) on 1 July 1995.
190 H Collins, "Good Faith in European Contract Law" (1994) 14 O/LS 229,241-242. See also D Yates
"Commentary on 'Two Concepts of Good Faith"" (1995) 8 /CL 145, 149, 151.
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the Directive. This parallels the point developed above, namely that the "fine print" doctrine
and certain techniques of contact interpretation can be quite readily reconciled with a
"formal" approach to contract law.191
Collins argues that article 3(1) sets "the substantive test", but notes limits. First although
it challenges terms that cause a "significant imbalance" in the parties' rights and obligations
under the contract, the focus is only on the subsidiary and collateral obligations
(warranties, conditions, exemption clauses and agreed remedies), and whether they are
balanced in some way in the consumer's favour. Pursuant to article 4(2), the Directive does
not cover the principal obligations, such as the nature of the goods or the price. Thus,
Collins suggests that its motivation as promoting "substantive fairness" in exchange is
limited, and certainly does not extend to "social market" objectives aiming to raise overall
minimum standards in the market for goods. However, he suggests that the latter objectives
might be read into the second requirement of article 3(1), the requirement of good faith. The
Preamble suggests an underlying principle promoting broader "solidarity" in contracting in
consumer markets. But he acknowledges that a more "formal" reading of good faith is also
possible, limiting the requirement to procedural fairness in the bargaining process, and
perhaps to the regulation of "fine print" problems - again seen in terms of "market failure".
This makes it more than "arguable that [the direct reference to good faith in the Directive]
will have profound effects on the English law of contracts".192 Finally, there may be a
particular risk of conflicting readings when an English lawyer approaches a Directive, the
product of EC law and Continental conceptions, using English techniques of statutory
interpretation.193 Thus, in the case of the Directive, even superficially content-oriented
legislative standards run the risk of not being consistently applied in a "substantive"
manner within the English law system. That pattern of development would support the
Atiyah and Summers' general proposition.
New Zealand
Impetus towards a more substantive approach in the wider legislative reform process in
New Zealand is, if anything, even weaker. Discussion about the possible contours of a duty
of good faith is circumscribed, lacking the stimulation of a major outside development like
the EC Directive in England.194
191 Above n 22.
192 Beatson, above n 77, 143.
193 See S Bright and C Bright "Unfair Terms in Land Contracts: Copy Out or Cop Out?" (1995) 111 LQR 655,
and M Attew 'Teleological Interpretation and Land Law" (1995) 58 MLR 696.
194 Article 7(1) of the Vienna Sales Convention (in force in New Zealand from 1 October 1995) requires the
Convention - not necessarily the parties' sales contract - to be interpreted so as to promote "the observance in
good faith in international trade". However as the New Zealand Law Commission has noted (The United
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The criticism of the Law Commission's draft scheme for regulating Unfair Contracts has
already been mentioned.195 Its demise is now seen as resulting in part from its attempt to
propose a reconsideration of philosophical underpinnings in contract law.196 That such a
tentative attempt to do so elicited such a response marks a strong contrast to the Japanese
experience, where a similar opportunity has been taken in stride and has eventually led to
some revival - now perhaps with sounder jurisprudential grounding - at the practical level
of impetus for legislative reform.197 New Zealand's experience is thus consistent with a
more formal approach.
Lastly, one noticeable change in this part of the contract law landscape in New Zealand
is the enactment of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. By insisting that certain guarantees
cannot be contracted out of in consumer sales, the Act imposes new norms of contract
validity.198 But, compared to the EC Directive, it has emerged with little debate on possible
underlying rationales. This hampers its potential for injecting more substantive reasoning
into New Zealand law. Further, given the Act's limited scope and occasionally complex
drafting, it too is likely to be approached in a formal manner, at least initially.199
Japan
In Japan, the tendency for important categories of unfair contract cases to be "siphoned
off', to be directly regulated by statute, has already been noted. Kitagawa lists a total of 16
statutes directly controlling aspects of contractual validity, often in transactions on
standard forms.200 However, each statute's area of coverage has been limited, and even in
areas where attempts to expand its scope might have been anticipated, the tendency has been
to wait for legislative amendment. To a lesser degree, this pattern holds for an emerging
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: New Zealand's Proposed Acceptance
(Wellington, 1992) §100), the confusing wording represents a compromise. (See also E A Farnsworth, Paper
presented at the Eason-Weinmar Colloquium on International and Comparative Law: "Duties of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing under the Unidroit Principles, Relevant International Conventions and National Laws" (1995)
3 Tul J Intl and Comp L 47,56-57.) Other than the Commission's report, there has been no published discussion
whatsoever in New Zealand regarding this concept of "good faith", now incorporated into New Zealand law.
195 Above n 101.
196 Sutton, above n 93,3.
197 Below, text at n 204-205.
198 Furthermore, it is of potentially greater effect than an English counterpart, as it allows direct actions
against manufacturers: cf G Howells 'The Modernization of Sales Law?" [1995] LMCLQ 192.
199 Some of its complexity is noted by T Telfer 'The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993" (1995) 1 NZBLQ 46.
200 Above n 95, §1.07[4][b].
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tendency to regulate unfairness in contracting through local government ordinances.201
Combined with the formal dimension even within the window for more substantive
reasoning offered by Articles 1(2) and 90, this has added a formal dimension to the whole
area.
Recently, there has been considerable academic discussion of the issues in regulating
unfair contracts as part of a more systematic framework. This discussion has roots in
studies in the early 1980s of overseas reforms, such as the UCTA and initiatives at the EC
level, at a time when regulation of standard form contracts was being investigated by a
government advisory body, the Social Policy Council (Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai). But that
more practical edge was has somewhat dulled. This reduced the immediate prospects for the
introduction of general legislation containing new content-oriented standards, drawing on
some of those overseas reforms. First, Japanese commentators increasingly realised the
extent - and sometimes usefulness - of "administrative guidance" in regulating various
standard forms used in particular industries.202 In some cases, as in life insurance, the
standard form must be approved by the responsible Ministry, which is therefore in a
position to threaten de facto, if not legal sanctions to control excesses. Such control was
201 The approach of the Tokyo City Ordinance for Consumer Living (Tokyo-to Shohi Seikatsu Jorei), for instance,
is rather ambiguous. It dates back to 1975, but has been periodically amended, most recently in 1994 (Tokyo
City Ordinance No 110, 6 October 1994, in force since 1 January 1995). On the one hand, article 25 of the
Ordinance establishes broad, generally worded categories of "improper dealings", including those largely
covered by doctrines of unconscionability or undue influence (paragraph 2),and those condemning "contracts
containing terms which are excessively unfair and disadvantageous, violating the requirement of good faith
(shingizoku) in dealings" (paragraph 3). Further, even after the latest amendment, the Ordinance, and
Regulations thereunder (kisoku), are still largely hortatory in nature. In particular, the sanctions for infringing
the rights set out pursuant to article 1 and the Regulations are that the Governor may issue guidance (shido)
against, or warn infringers (kankoku), and may publicise details of those who refuse to follow warnings (see S
Ito, "Futekisei na Torihiki Koi Kisei ni kansuru To-joni oyobi Kisei Kaisei no Gaiyo [Overview of the Amendment to
the Capital's Ordinance and Regulations relating to Ihe Control of 'Improper Dealings']" (1995) 1065 Juristo 14).
Such "adminstrative guidance" (below n 202) may also indicate a more substantive approach, namely less
'enforcement formality" (Atiyah and Summers, above n 8, 18, 186-221; see also L Nottage, "Contract Law and
Practice in Japan: An Antipodean Perspective" in H Baum (ed) Japan - Economic Success and Legal System (Berlin,
de Gruyter, forthcoming 1996), fn 46). On the other hand, the Regulations are extremely detailed, now
attempting to cover 40 categories of unfair dealings. Already, commentators are calling for attention both to
unfair dealings which are arguably still not covered, and to the need for a continuous process of amendment to
meet other specific dealings as they arise. This more formal dimension is also apparent in recent calls for more
specific statutory regulation in other regions. See Note, "Chumoku sareru Shohisha higai boshi oyobi Higai kyusai
ni kansuru Chiho jichitai no Shohisha gyosei to Shohi seikatsu jorei no doko [Noticeable Directions in Local
Government Consumer Ordinances and Administration relating to Prevention and Compensation of Damage to
Consumers]" (1996) 586 NBL 5.
202 "Administrative guidance occurs where administrators take action of no coercive legal effect that
encourages regulated parties to act in a specific way in order to achieve some administrative aim." (M Young
"Juicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in
Jaan" (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 924.
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heightened by a Council Committee report in 1984, which identified problems in particular
areas after widespread public discussion and research.203 The awareness of such
mechanisms, and changes that followed in some of the standard forms reviewed in that
report, took some urgency out of the subsequent discussion. Secondly, a main problem came
to be perceived not as particular unfair contract terms, but as improperly inducing the
contract itself. This raised more general issues, calling for more consideration of how
various private law techniques did or might deal with this problem. Predictably, it resulted
in more general jurisprudential arguments.204 By default, this hiatus left the Japanese law
on unfair contracts with substantive roots, but formal counter-tendencies.
Some momentum has now re-emerged. Concern has grown about the inability of
administrative guidance to adequately control the range of cases involving claims of
contractual unfairness, particularly those involving consumers.205 The Economic Planning
Agency, responsible for coordinating consumer policy, formed a working group which
reported on the EC Directive in 1994. It is too early to predict whether this will eventually
lead to new legislation for regulation of unfair contracts generally, and thus to a significant
injection of a more substantive approach into this area of Japanese law. The formal counter-
tendency identified in this Part suggests that that may take some time to realise.
5 Summary: Form and Substance in the Law of Unfair Contracts
Testing the broad propositions of Atiyah and Summers, Part B has considered the extent
to which content-, rather than source-oriented standards are used to determine the
authoritativeness of contract law, as one indication of the degree to which substantive,
rather than formal reasoning is accepted in four legal systems. The fine print doctrine or
similar approaches are found in all the legal systems, but this can be indicative of either a
substantive or a more formal orientation. However a consideration of the doctrines of good
faith and unconscionability suggests a pattern with US law at the substantive end of the
spectrum, Japanese law as somewhat more formal, and New Zealand and English law at the
formal end of the spectrum. Closer analysis of other contract law doctrines listed by Atiyah
and Summers seems likely to reinforce this pattern.206 The general role of legislative reform
in this area, of controlling contractual unfairness, does just that.
203 Z Kitagawa "Unfair Contract Terms in Administrative Guidance" (1985) 16 Rechtstheorie 181.
204 E Hoshino "Gendai Keiyaku Ho Ron - Yakkan, Shohisha Keiyaku wo Kien to shite [Contemporary Contract
Law Theory - Reconsidered in the Light of Standard Form and Consumer Contracts]" (1991) 469 NBL 1
205 Matsumoto, above n 25, 146. Furthermore, foreign observers are increasingly critical of administrative
guidance's "intransparency" (see eg M Dean "Administrative Guidance in Japanese Law: A Threat to the Rule of
Law" [1991] BL 398).
206 See eg the brief discussion of penalty clauses (above n 159).
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C A Broader Framework for Comparing Other Developments in Contract Law
This pattern may hold for other aspects of the "authoritative formality of law"
mentioned by Atiyah and Summers (tentatively summarised as 1.1.A, 1.1.B and 1.2 on the
Figure in the Appendix). It also seems to hold for the other suggested dimensions of formal
reasoning (2.- 3.), and for corresponding general "attributes" of formal legal systems (4.-
6.).207
If there are such systemic local variations within and surrounding the contract law of
each legal system, Atiyah and Summers' framework is a salutary reminder that they tend to
be deep-rooted and inter-related. Counter-systemic developments will therefore tend to be
met with resistance.208 What appear to be inevitable developments in domestic contract law
must be reevaluated for that broader perspective. The form-substance framework promises
more sensitivity and structured insight into differences in result, conceptualisation, and
legal reasoning as a whole, in the context of traditional ways of systematically ordering
legal institutions.
That framework also seems useful in analysing developments at an international level.
In particular, if an international instrument or restatement embodies a more substantive
orientation, formal systems may be expected to be more reluctant to embrace it.209 For
instance, some see the Vienna Sales Convention as exhibiting such an orientation.210 This
would make less surprising its early adoption by the US, its belated adoption by New
Zealand (largely driven by pragmatic considerations), and vigorous opposition by some
prominent English jurists to its adoption there.211 Furthermore, even after implementation of
207 Each dimension is briefly explored in Nottage (1995, above n 1), and more fully analysed in the author's
ongoing PhD thesis research.
208 Atiyah and Summers (above n 8,430) also briefly anticipated this point.
209 Abstracting from everyday pragmatic impediments, often similar in each domestic legal system. L Nottage
"Trade Law Harmonisation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Realist's View from New Zealand - and a Way
Forward?" [1995] NZLJ 295.
210 A Kastely "Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention"
(1988) 8 Northwest J of Intl L and Bus 574. Uchida, above n 1, 12. A better example of a substantive orientation
may be the Unidroit Principles (R Hyland "On Setting Forth the Law of Contract: A Foreword" (1992) 40 AJCL
541). Specifically, they also include provisions directly addressing contractual unfaimess, principally §3.10 (see
Bonell, above n 150, 90-106). However, since the Principles must be adopted by individual parties and
otherwise do not have force of law, it is very difficult to know the extent to which they are "adopted".
211 J Hobhouse, "International Conventions and Commercial Law" (1990) 106 LQR 530. Japan would remain
somewhat of an exception, in still not having adopted CISG, despite a largely substantive orientation. However
the Japanese legal system does have a formal streak, and the pragmatic impediments in Japan's case are
potentially particularly severe (see D Henderson "Some Developments in Japan's Transnational Law" in R
Cranston and R Goode (eds) Consumer and Commercial law: National and International Dimensions 60 (Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1993)
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such instruments, interpretations may tend to diverge roughly along formal and substantive
lines.
The desire for more convergence among legal systems may be laudable.212 However, such
convergence may be more gradual than expected. Similarly, those who perceive or anticipate
widespread and rapid change in a particular legal system's contract law will need to
carefully analyse carefully its overall orientation and that of its surrounding institutions -
its national legal ethos.
212 See eg B Markesinis (ed), The Gradual Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign injluences and European Law on
the Eve of the 2lst Century, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993); K Sono "Towards a Modern Jus Commune:
Converging Trends in a Shrinking World - The Law of Contract" Paper presented at the MLS Annual
Conference, "Towards a Modern Jus Commune", Buenos Aires, September 1995, 6-7.
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Etude comparative des concepts de substance et de procedure aux Etats-Unis,
Angleterre, et Nouvelle-Zelande: plus particulikrement dans le context des
clauses abusives en mati@re contractuelle
Rdcemment la doctrine a prdconisd que dans de nombreux droits internes, des
changements soient apportds dans le domaine du droit des contrats.
Une justification souvent avancee repose sur le constat que cette matiere doit s'adapter
aux exigences qui d@coulent de l'internationalisation des rapports contractuels. Cet article
met en garde contre toutes tendances h une gdn6ralisation Mtive. Il met en exergue que
chaque droit interne demeure fortement attacha h des valeurs constantes qui apparaissent
aussi bien dans la doctrine, dans les ddcisions de justice ou encore dans les institutions
juridiques. Partant toute vell@it@s de nouveaute se heurtera indvitablement h une r@sistance
soutenue qui ne sera pas sans rdpercussion sur les rapports contractuels internationaux.
Pour examiner l'orientation gdndrale des 4 systtames juridiques retenus pour cette 6tude,
la discussion ddbordera le cadre de l'analyse traditionnelle prdconisde par Atiyah et
Summers, A savoir opdrer une distinction entre la forme et le fond. Le choix de la presente
6tude s'est port@ sur une analyse th6orique de plusieurs diffdrences entre le droit anglais et
le droit am6ricain. Pareille ddmonstration vaudra pour le droit ndo zdlandais qui A
beaucoup d'@gards suit le modhle anglais. Il pourra m@me etre dtendu au droit japonais qui
d'une part, est h certains 6gards, imprdgnd des pr6ceptes de la tradition civiliste et qui
d'autre part tend h privildgier le fond sur la forme.
De plus un des aspects de ce distinguo entre la forme et le fond, h savoir la valeur qu'il
convient d'accorder aux normes, ddpend largement de la mani&re dont les r&gles du droit des
contrats privildgieront soit l'origine de la regle soit le crit*re du contenu. Cet article analyse
de mani&re ddtaillde trois exemples particuliers proposds par Atiyah et Summers: la doctrine
de la bonne foi, du dot et de la valeur juridique des dispositions contractuelles indiqudes en
petits caract*res. Si sur ce dernier point A l'inverse de la position fort claire des tribunaux,
les justifications doctrinales retenues demeurent encore incertaines, les deux autres
exemples font ressortir que chaque syst*me particulier du droit des contrats continue
ndanmoins & se d@velopper tout en conservant une orientation stable. De plus ces trois
exemples reprdsentent une grande part des Ngles relatives aux principes gouvernant les
situations de dds@quilibre contractuel, et plus particulierement en ce qui concernent les
contrats d'adhdsion. DKs lors il n'est gu*re surprenant de retrouver dans chaque syst&me de
droit considdrd la marque rdcurrente de l'intervention du 16gislateur qui tend h imposer des
constantes iddologiques et conceptuelles du droit dans le domaine des contrats.
L'analyse retenue ddpendra aussi de la place que l'on accordera aux autres 616ments
constitutifs du cadre traditionnel dans lequel l'opposition "fond/ forme" s'exerce. En effet
certaines recherches actuelles tendent A ddmontrer que ces param*tres annexes ne sont pas
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sans influencer le droit des contrats tant au niveau des droits internes qu'au niveau
international.
